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The old way involves accepting a set of
assumptions that are without factual basis . . .
Foremost on the list is the assumption that
commitment for mental illness is a medical
problem, not a legal problem. Therefore, since
psychiatrists are the experts, their conclusions can
be accepted without question. This fallacious
assumption must be dispelled.
Judge P. Charles Jones1
Michael is a single man in his forties. Sometimes Michael
drinks too much alcohol and his alcohol consumption has landed
him in a hospital detox unit twice before. During his third stay in
detox Michael’s family petitions the local district court to force
him into a 30-day residential treatment program that takes place on
the grounds of a local prison. Under order by the court, police
bring Michael to the courthouse and place him in a holding cell
while he awaits a hearing on his family’s petition. At the hearing
Michael is represented by an attorney. After four days in detox
Michael is completely sober, and no one contends that he is unable
to think clearly; that he has committed or is suspected of having
committed a crime; or that he poses any sort of danger to other
people. Michael tells the court that he opposes the commitment
petition; that he does not want to be hospitalized; and that the
hospital has provided him with the names and phone numbers of a
substance-abuse counselor and a local contact from Alcoholics
Anonymous if he wants help in controlling his alcohol
consumption. Michael asks the court to release him so that he can
go home. The judge calls the court psychologist to the stand and
asks whether, under the terms of the state’s involuntary
commitment statute, Michael is an “alcoholic” whose use of
alcohol is likely to cause “serious harm.” She answers in the
affirmative, whereupon the judge orders Michael to be committed
for 30 days against his will. The police place Michael in handcuffs
and take him away. Next case.

1.
Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of
Lessard v. Schmidt, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 503, 503 (1976) (quoting Dane County,
Wisconsin Judge Jones).
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This is not merely a hypothetical. In a number of states, a
person can be committed to a psychiatric facility against his will
on grounds of “danger” or “risk of harm” to self as evidenced
purely by the person’s consumption of alcohol or other
intoxicating drugs, and the risk that continuing to ingest such
substances will cause harm to the person, whether intended or not.2
And the example raises a large and fundamental question for the
law: When may a court force someone into psychiatric treatment
against her will, based purely on the judgment—with which the
patient herself expressly and coherently disagrees—that she needs
2.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 35 (2013) (defining
“alcoholic” as “a person who chronically or habitually consumes alcoholic
beverages to the extent that (1) such use substantially injures his health or
substantially interferes with his social or economic functioning; or (2) he has
lost the power of self-control over the use of such beverages”). The statute
provides:
Any police officer, physician, spouse, blood relative, guardian
or court official may petition in writing any district court or
any division of the juvenile court department for an order of
commitment of a person whom he has reason to believe is an
alcoholic or substance abuse . . . . In the event of the person’s
failure to appear [at a court-ordered hearing in response to the
petition], the court may issue a warrant for the person’s arrest .
. . . If after a hearing and based upon competent testimony,
which shall include, but not be limited to, medical testimony,
the court finds that such person is an alcoholic . . . and there is
a likelihood of serious harm as a result of the person’s
alcoholism…the court may order such person to be committed
for a period not to exceed ninety days [with intermittent
reviews by the state health department at thirty, forty-five,
sixty, and seventy-five days] . . . .The person may be
committed to the Massachusetts correctional institution at
Bridgewater, if a male, or at Framingham, if a female, if there
are not suitable facilities available under said chapter 111B;
provided, however, that the person so committed shall be
housed and treated separately from convicted criminals.
Id. See also C OLO . R EV . S TAT . A NN . § 27-81-102, 112 (West 2013) (defining
“alcoholic” as a person who habitually lacks self-control as to the use of
alcoholic beverages or uses alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her
health is substantially impaired or endangered or his or her social or economic
function is substantially disrupted; providing for the involuntary commitment of
alcoholics who have threatened harm to themselves or others, or are
“incapacitated by alcohol.”).
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care? The laws of involuntary commitment typically specify that
courts may do this when the person is “mentally ill” and poses a
“danger” or “risk of harm” to self or others. But if “mental illness”
can be defined as the voluntary consumption of intoxicating
substances, and “danger” as risk of harm to the patient’s own
health, what boundaries constrain the law’s power to force
resisting individuals into treatment?
Compassion may argue that mental illness should be
treated. But for the law, compassion alone cannot dictate the
answer. There is a Law of Compassion, which finds powerful
expression in our positive law, establishing public programs that
assist needy families, the unemployed, the elderly, the mentally ill.
Such voluntary programs pose no threat to beneficiaries’ fundamental rights and freedoms. But when the law is asked, on
grounds of compassion, to forcibly incarcerate a human being who
poses no danger to others and has committed no crime, that is
another matter entirely. In that situation the law’s first job is to act
not as an agent of compassion but as an agent of respect for the
individual. When it comes to involuntary commitment of the
mentally ill, the law’s unique and vital role is to guard the rights of
the person whose freedom is at stake. In our national conversation
about mental illness and involuntary commitment, we have forgotten this fact. We must remember it again. When presented with
a petition that would force an innocent person into psychiatric
treatment against her will, the law’s presumptive role is to defend
the perspective and the preferences of that person against society’s
contrary preferences, including the contrary preferences of those
who would offer treatment that the person does not want and has
clearly said that she does not want.
In this context the law’s job is very different— from and is
sometimes in conflict with—the treatment imperative which
dominates the mental health profession. That is worrisome, but
may be necessary. In guarding the rights of the mentally ill, as in
guarding the rights of all persons, the law must ask its own
questions, enforce its own standards, and stand its ground against
unjustified (although often well-intentioned) efforts that deprive
innocent persons of basic freedoms.
When a court forces an unwilling person into psychiatric
treatment, the law deprives that person of two very important
rights—the right to refuse medical treatment and (in the case of
involuntary hospitalization) the right to liberty itself. In cases
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where a psychologically disturbed respondent is believed to pose a
serious danger to others, the state clearly has a legitimate interest in
confining the respondent, and most discussion concerns the issue of
dangerousness—how it is defined; how accurately it can be
determined; how vulnerable it may be to bias or mistake.3 In cases
involving risk of self-harm but not harm to others, the law more
openly wrestles with the values of autonomy and respect for
individual rights. Should we allow courts to commit a person
involuntarily on the ground that he poses a serious risk of harm, not
to others but to himself? If so, under what conditions is this
permissible against the conceptual backdrop of the person’s
presumptive rights to refuse treatment and to retain personal
liberty?
Psychiatry and Law have different perspectives, and
inherently different roles, with respect to this issue. The contemporary standard for involuntary commitment—requiring both a
“mental illness” and “danger to self”—attempts to marry those
roles but has succeeded only in confusing the courts, too often
causing them to convert what is fundamentally a legal question
about legitimate grounds for overruling individual rights into a
psychiatric question about the need for treatment. Reform efforts
over the last three decades have not changed this reality. Indeed,
today the loudest voices on the issue hail from the mental health
profession, arguing that existing legal constraints on involuntary
commitment are too stringent and that legal barriers should be
dismantled so that more patients deemed mentally ill will be
forcibly treated.4 This Article opposes that stance. The standard for
involuntary commitment on grounds of danger to self should be
articulated in non-medical terms and should be adjudicated as a
purely legal matter. In making the case for that position, I hope to
illuminate a core tension between law and psychiatry.

3.
See infra p.7 and notes 15–16.
4.
For example, see Eliminating the Barriers to the Treatment of Mental
Illness, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., available at www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org (2011) [hereinafter Eliminating the Barriers], summarizing the content
and the history of this argument.
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I. RIGHTS V. TREATMENT: A CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW AND
PSYCHOLOGY
For most of U.S. history, the standard for involuntary
commitment required only that mental health professionals certify
the person was “mentally ill” and “in need of treatment.”5 That
changed during the 1970s, when advocates for the mentally ill
successfully championed a new standard which required both a
psychiatric finding of “mental illness” and a legal finding of
“danger to self or others” in order to hospitalize or treat a person
against her will.6 Grounded in both the Due Process revolution
which had significantly expanded the rights of criminal
defendants,7 and the Civil Rights movement which had
5.
See, e.g., Eric Turkheimer & Charles D. Parry, Why the Gap?
Practice and Policy in Civil Commitment Hearings, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 646,
646 (1992) [hereinafter Turkheimer & Parry, Why the Gap?].
Until the late 1960s most state commitment processes were
medical rather than judicial. Under the State’s parens patriae
powers, physicians had the authority to confine and treat the
mentally ill. The most common form of commitment was the
two-physician certificate, whereby patients could be
hospitalized on the statement of two physicians, without
advice of counsel, a hearing, or any recourse other than a writ
of habeas corpus.
Id.
6.
In addition to this change in the substantive standard for involuntary
commitment, a number of procedural changes were built into the standard
during this period. See, e.g., id. at 646.
The civil commitment reforms were both procedural and
substantive. Procedurally, most states mandated due process
safeguards, including prior notice, authority for judicial
officials over clinicians, legal counsel, the right to call and
confront witnesses, more rigorous standards of proof, LRAs,
limited commitment periods, right to appeal, and regular court
review. Substantively, the standards for involuntary
commitment were changed from simple requirements for
mental illness and need for treatment to legal standards of
dangerousness to self or others and, in some states, grave
disability or inability to care for self.”)
Id. (citations omitted).
7.
See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that delinquency
proceedings involving juvenile defendants must comply with procedural Due
Process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution).
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successfully fought for legislation outlawing discrimination,8 the
new standard for involuntary commitment was designed to give
courts an independent role in the commitment decision, a role
which would honor the patient’s presumptive right to refuse
medical treatment.9 Under the dangerousness element, judges were
to be the guardians of individual liberty, allowing forcible
commitment only under circumstances in which a mentally ill
respondent posed a clear and immediate risk of harm.10
In a series of cases during the Seventies, both state and
federal courts argued for the addition of a “dangerousness” prong
to the traditional “need for treatment” standard. Many saw the
traditional standard as too vague, overly biased toward medical (as
opposed to rights-based) values, and discriminatory toward the
mentally ill.11 California took the lead on the legislative front,
passing the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act in 1967. The LPS
8.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Crow et al., Who is at Greatest Risk of WorkRelated Discrimination – Women, Blacks, or Homosexuals?, 11 EMP. RESP. &
RTS. J. 15 (1998) (discussing civil rights paradigm as basis for expanding rights
of women, gays, and lesbians). See generally Paul S. Miller, Disability Civil
Rights & a New Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century: The Expansion of Civil
Rights Beyond Race, Gender, and Age, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 512 (1998).
9.
See, e.g., VA Hiday & SJ Markell, Components of Dangerousness:
Legal Standards in Civil Commitment, 3 INT’L J. OF LAW & PSYCHIATRY 405,
405 (1980) [hereinafter Hiday & Markell, Components of Dangerousness]
(“Dangerousness seemed to provide a legally enforceable test that would with
one stroke protect the public’s safety and limit involuntary hospitalization to
those who truly required confinement, while simultaneously allowing the nondangerous mentally ill to be treated in the community”); VA Hiday, Court
Decisions in Civil Commitment: Independence or Deference?, 4 INT’L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 159, 160 (1981) (“[B]y specifying due process rights and requiring
court hearings the new legislation is moving to check perfunctory or no court
review. Essentially it is declaring that medical opinion alone is not enough to
confine a person to a mental hospital; and thus, it is defining the role of the court
to be independent of psychiatry. The court may accept medical
recommendation[s]; but to achieve the desired independence from psychiatric
expertise, the court must refuse to accept psychiatric conclusory statements
without supporting facts”).
10.
See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (E.D. Wis.
1972) (“[U]nless constitutionally prescribed procedural due process
requirements for involuntary civil commitment are met, no person should be
subjected to ‘treatment’ against his will”).
11.
See, e.g., id. at 1086–104.
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Act, which took full effect in 1972, required a finding of
dangerousness specified as either (1) danger to others; (2) danger to
self; or (3) grave disability (which the California courts defined as
a form of “danger to self.”).12 Other states followed suit, and by
1978 all but two states had built “dangerousness” into their
standards for involuntary commitment.13
During the 1970s and 1980s, a sizeable literature in
psychology analyzed the dangerousness-based standard in general,
and its “danger to others” prong in particular. Abolitionists, some
of whom had favored the reforms on grounds that they would
restrict the power of the state to commit unwilling people for
treatment, continued to fight for the abolishment or nearabolishment of such forced hospitalizations.14 Within the mental
health profession, the new standard remained controversial among
some psychologists and psychiatrists who worried that it prevented
the mental-health system from helping patients who desperately
needed (but sometimes opposed) hospitalization and treatment.15
12.
See, e.g., SP Segal et al., Civil Commitment in the Psychiatric
Emergency Room, 45 ARCH GEN. PSYCHIATRY 753 (1988); Doe v. Gallinot, 486
F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d 657 F.2d 1017, (9th Cir. 1981) (grave
disability element “implicitly requires a finding of harm to self”).
13.
See, e.g., Hiday & Markell, Components of Dangerousness, supra
note 9.
14.
See generally RALPH SLOVENKO, LAW IN PSYCHIATRY/ PSYCHIATRY
IN LAW, 433 (2009); BRUCE J. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL
PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS, AND THE LAW (1972); American Association for the
Abolition of Involuntary Mental Hospitalization, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1698
(1971) (Letter to the Editor by AAAIMH founder Thomas Szasz); Stephen J.
Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of
the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54 (1982) [hereinafter Morse, A
Preference for Liberty].
15.
E.g., Paul Chodoff, The Case of Involuntary Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496 (1976); Pauline Rabin & David Folks,
Dangerousness as the Criterion for Involuntary Hospitalization: A Time to
Reassess, 246 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 990 (1981); Donald A. Treffert, Dying With
Their Rights On, 2 PRISM 49, 49–52 (1974). As I explore infra Part II.C., this
view has acquired considerable momentum in the wake of deinstitutionalization.
For more contemporary iterations, see, e.g., PS Appelbaum, Almost a
Revolution: An International Perspective on the Law of Involuntary Commitment, 25 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 135 (1997); Minds on the Edge: Facing
Mental Illness: Fred Friendly Seminars, Columbia University, New York (PBS
television broadcast Oct. 2009) [hereinafter Minds on the Edge]. See also
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Scholars analyzed various problems with implementing the new
standard—for example, the difficulty of deciding which kinds of
harm justified involuntary commitment; the difficulty of deciding
what degree of risk justified forcibly committing someone against
his will; and, the difficulty of assessing the actual risk that any
particular respondent will inflict harm, particularly where the
respondent had never in fact committed a violent harm and the fear
was simply that he or she might do so in the future.16
Oddly, almost none of the discussion has specifically
focused on the “danger to self” aspect of the modern test. Almost
all states allow forcible commitment of a person on grounds of
“danger” or “risk of harm” to self; yet most literature on the subject
treats “danger to self or others” as a single concept and argues its
virtues and vices in that manner.17
That is a mistake. Although there is sometimes significant
overlap, the concept of “danger to self” is importantly different
from that of “danger to others.” Even allowing for all the problems
associated with forcibly confining someone on grounds of danger

Eliminating the Barriers, supra note 4, for a prominent voice in favor of
involuntary commitment based on need for treatment (often referred to as “grave
disability”) alone.
16.
See, e.g., Morse, A Preference for Liberty, supra note 14; Edward P.
Mulvey & Charles W. Lidz, Back to Basics: A Critical Analysis of Dangerousness Research in a New Legal Environment, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 209
(1985); J. C. Phelan & B.G. Link, The Growing Belief That People With Mental
Illnesses Are Violent: The Role of the Dangerousness Criterion for Civil
Commitment, 33 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY, S7 (1998);
SP Segal et al., Civil Commitment in the Psychiatric Emergency Room: The
Assessment of Dangerousness by Emergency Room Clinicians, 45 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 748 (1988); SA Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for
Exploring Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOL. 224 (1978);
Carol A. B. Warren, Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder: The
Application of California’s Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 11 L. & SOC’Y REV.
629 (1976).
17.
A partial, but notable, exception is Alan M. Dershowitz, Psychiatry
in the Legal Process: “A Knife That Cuts Both Ways,” 51 JUDICATURE 370
(1967). Although Dershowitz’s main point is that the insanity and commitment
standards should be purely legal and not medicalized, he does raise the
libertarian argument (a la John Stuart Mill) as to involuntary commitment on
grounds of “danger to self,” and he explores some interesting hypotheticals
which are meant to test out the premises of that standard.
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to others,18 few doubt that preventing foreseeable violence inflicted
upon innocent others is a legitimate concern of the state. Not so
when the question is whether the state should be able to force
treatment on someone in order to prevent him from inflicting harm
on himself. As to that question, our intuitions are more libertarian:19
At least presumptively, the state should refuse to interfere with the
clearly expressed preferences of adult persons (e.g., the preference
not to receive psychiatric treatment) even if the state disagrees with
the wisdom of those preferences.
Should the law of involuntary commitment instantiate the
libertarian view? Two extremes define the spectrum of answers to
this question. At one end are Abolitionists, according to whom
involuntary civil commitment is always wrong no matter what the
circumstances. Abolitionists argue that no justification exists for
treating mentally ill persons differently from any others—that
forcing such persons to undergo treatment or incarceration against
their will is not justified unless and until they have committed a
crime.20 We do not permit the state to engage in preventive
detention of non-mentally ill persons simply on the grounds that
they may be dangerous. Suicide (for example) is not a crime. Thus,
to authorize civil preventive detention of those deemed mentally ill
and a “danger to self” is to invidiously discriminate against the
mentally ill.21
18.
See sources cited supra notes 15–16.
19.
In the sense that we incline more toward the view of John Stuart Mill
in this famous passage from On Liberty:
The only purpose for which power can rightfully be
exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because . . . to do so would be wise or even right . . . .
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Penguin Books 1974).
20.
See, e.g., Chodoff, supra note 15 (describing, though not favoring,
the abolitionist position).
21.
See, e.g., id.; see also ENNIS, supra note 14; Morse, A Preference for
Liberty, supra note 14; Jacob Sullum, The Legal and Moral Problems of
Involuntary Commitment, Mental Health and the Law, CATO UNBOUND, Aug.
24, 2012, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/08/24/Jacob-sullum/legal-moralproblems-involuntary-commitment; Jeffrey Schaler, Strategies of Psychiatric
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At the other extreme are Paternalists, who argue that courts
should be able to forcibly commit a person if and when mental
health professionals determine that the person is in serious need of
treatment. Such treatment, presumptively at least, would continue
until the experts determine that the patient no longer needs it.
Paternalists argue that the contemporary rights-based standard of
involuntary commitment denies treatment to desperately needy
persons for whom a period of enforced hospitalization might
significantly improve, or even save, their lives.22 For such protreatment advocates, the refusal to hospitalize (or force outpatient
treatment upon) mentally ill patients who cannot responsibly care
for themselves is cruel and inhumane, and a legal standard which
makes it difficult or impossible to force such treatment has created
a society in which mentally ill people are “dying with their rights
on.”23
Some understanding of history will be helpful here. Part II
of this essay traces the victory of the rights-based standard for
involuntary commitment, and also the push-back from ProTreatment forces. Part III engages the bedrock conceptual issues
presented by involuntary civil commitment in cases of “danger to
self”, using two paradigmatic cases of foreseeable self-harm to
examine the justifications for forcing persons into psychiatric
treatment. Part III more closely engages the core concepts of
“mental illness” and “danger to self”—the medical and the legal
prongs of the test for involuntary commitment—and forces an
examination of each prong separately and of the test as a whole.
Like other legal tests (such as the tests for insanity) which attempt
to marry law and psychology, the test for involuntary civil
commitment highlights an important and recurring conflict between
the law’s focus on individual rights and psychiatry’s focus on
treating illness. I argue that where state coercion on grounds of
danger to self is the core issue, the involuntary commitment

Coercion, Mental Health and the Law, CATO UNBOUND, Aug. 6, 2012,
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/08/06/jeffrey-schaler/strategies-psychiatriccoercion.
22.
See, e.g., sources supra note 15.
23.
Treffert, Dying With Their Rights On, supra note 15; Minds on the
Edge, supra note 15.
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decision should be wholly grounded in legal, and not medical,
principles.
II. LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT:
SOME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Less than a decade after the nationwide adoption of the
“mentally ill and dangerous” standard for involuntary commitment,
scholars and commentators identified a troublesome “gap” between
the letter and spirit of the new commitment laws.24 One author
summed up the issue as follows:
The failure of civil commitment procedures to meet
statutory requirements is one of the more reliable
findings in the applied social sciences. Most states
now require specific legal procedures and
behavioral standards for involuntary hospitalization
Nonetheless, empirical studies have demonstrated
that commitment hearings are rarely adversarial
and clinical concerns continue to take precedence
over legal issues.25
Thus, while reformers had envisioned a system in which
attorneys for patients adopted an adversarial role in zealous defense
of their clients’ interests and courts operated as independent
guardians of patients’ rights, the reality was that attorneys often
failed to adopt an adversary role; judges frequently failed to make
respondents’ rights known to them in court; and, in direct
contradiction to the role assigned them by statute, judges continued
to defer to the recommendations of mental health experts on both
the questions of “mental illness” and “dangerousness” required to
commit respondents against their will.26 And while reformers had
predicted that the dangerousness-based standard would shrink the
24.
See, e.g., Roger Peters et al., The Effects of Statutory Change on the
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 73 (1987); Warren,
Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of California’s
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, supra note 16.
25.
Turkheimer & Parry, supra note 5, at 646.
26.
Id. at 647.
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number of involuntary commitments because it would offer greater
respect and protection to a respondent’s wish not to be treated,
empirical research revealed that the new and supposedly stricter
commitment statutes were having little if any effect on the rate of
involuntary commitments across the country.27 It seemed that the
rights-based vision had succeeded in changing the language of state
statutes but had failed to change the law on the ground, in court,
where the fate of patients and commitment petitions was being
decided under the supposedly new standard.
Why? What explains the emergence of a gap between the
standards set out in commitment statutes and the courts’ apparent
failure to comply with those standards when faced with actual
petitions for involuntary commitment? This Part re-examines the
historical evolution of the dangerousness standard for involuntary
commitment, looking for possible answers to these questions. I
focus on three key participants in the legal and political debate
which drove the passage of dangerousness-based statutes – (1) the
anti-psychiatry movement, including lawyers and advocates for the
rights of mentally ill people; ex-patients whose skepticism about
psychiatry and psychiatric treatments fueled the abolitionist belief
that involuntary civil commitment should simply not exist; and a
relatively small number of renegade psychiatrists, the most
prominent of whom was Thomas Szasz; (2) lawyers who viewed
the old, “need for treatment” commitment procedures as a violation
of patients’ rights and sought to deploy the Due Process model of
In Re Gault in order to change those procedures; and (3) the
mainstream community of psychologists, psychiatrists, and other
mental health professionals, many of whom opposed the incursion
of procedural and substantive due process into involuntary
commitment procedures on the ground that such procedures were
bad for patients. On the surface, the nationwide move to a dangerousness-based commitment standard seemed to be a dramatic
victory for the law and for the lawyer-driven fight to erase stigma
and discrimination against the mentally ill. But beneath that surface
27.
Id. See also James W. Luckey & John J. Berman, Effects of a New
Commitment Law on Involuntary Admissions and Service Utilization Patterns, 3
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1979); J. Monahan et al., Stone-Roth Model of Civil
Commitment and the California Dangerousness Standard, 39 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1267 (1982).
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the debate between the rights-based dangerousness standard and the
medical “need for treatment” standard played out in quite a
different way.
A. Anti-Psychiatry Meets the Due Process Revolution
The anti-psychiatry movement took root in the widespread
social and political unrest of the 1960s and 70s. Amid deepening
skepticism and mistrust of social, religious, governmental, and
military institutions, critics from both left and right depicted
psychiatry – particularly its power to define mental illness and to
justify and set in motion state coercion against those deemed
mentally ill – as a tool of the oppressor state, a means of routing the
different, the defiant, and the dissident into mental hospitals.28 The
voice linking psychiatry and justice was always implicit in this
critique, but that voice became an open battle cry when four young
lawyers – Bruce Ennis, Charles Halpern, Paul Friedman, and
Margaret Ewing – formed the Mental Health Law Project (MHLP)
in 1972. Drawing heavily on the views of libertarian psychiatrist
Thomas Szasz, whose anti-psychiatry crusade caught fire in the
United States about this time, Ennis and the MHLP took an
abolitionist position on involuntary commitment. They sought not
merely to constrain its availability or limit its effects, but to abolish
it entirely. In a preface to Ennis’s book Prisoners of Psychiatry:
Mental Patients, Psychiatrists, and the Law, Dr. Szasz praised
Ennis for endorsing the abolitionist view “that individuals
28.
This critique was highly ideological, from both ends of the political
spectrum. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Asylum, in THE FOUCAULT
READER 141 (Rabinow ed., 1984); R. D. Laing, The Schizophrenic Experience,
in THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 100 (1967); ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS:
ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES
(1961); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER
AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971); THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF
MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT (1974);
Andrew T. Scull, Madness and Segregative Control: The Rise of the Insane
Asylum, 24 SOC. PROBS. 337 (1977). Perhaps the chief critic of psychiatry from
the libertarian perspective was Thomas Szasz. See, e.g., THOMAS S. SZASZ,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF
MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES (1989); Thomas S. Szasz, J’Accuse: Psychiatry
and the Diminished American Capacity for Justice, 2 POL. PSYCHOL. 106
(1980). See also, ENNIS, supra note 14; SLOVENKO, supra note 14.
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incriminated as mentally ill do not need guarantees of treatment but
protection against their enemies—the legislators, judges, and
psychiatrists who persecute them in the name of mental health.”29
And in a 1974 interview published in Madness Network News,
Ennis declared: “My personal goal is either to abolish involuntary
commitment or to set up so many procedural roadblocks and
hurdles that it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the state to
commit people against their will.”30
Until abolition became politically possible, Due Process
would have to do. Warren Court decisions such as In Re Gault
offered the legal framework on which advocates for the mentally ill
based a national campaign to make involuntary civil commitment
more difficult, more time-limited, and less dependent on a
psychiatric (and thus by definition oppressive and unjust) decision
that the respondent “needs treatment.”31 In Gault, handed down in
1967, the United States Supreme Court decided that when a judgment of delinquency is at stake, states must offer juveniles the full
panoply of procedures required under the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause in adult criminal trials—including the right to
timely notice of charges, the right against self-incrimination, the
right to confront witnesses, and the right to defense counsel.32 The
Court rejected the state’s argument that such due process
protections should not apply to juveniles because the state acts as
parent, not adversary, to juvenile defendants.
The Court’s decision in Gault offered an apt due processbased model for another legal setting involving the deprivation of
liberty—involuntary commitment proceedings. As in Gault, states
in commitment cases had long argued for a lower due process
standard on the grounds that commitment is not a criminal
adjudication, that the state acts not as an adversary to the
respondent but instead as parens patriae.33 In Lessard v. Schmidt,
the court engaged, and rejected, the parens patriae argument,

29.
Id.
30.
SLOVENKO, supra note 14, at 433.
31.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
32.
Id.
33.
See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wisc. 1972)
(discussing and ultimately rejecting this argument).
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expressly modeling its response on the High Court’s opinion in
Gault.34
In Lessard, the Plaintiff, Alberta Lessard, was detained by
police after what they believed was a suicide attempt. She was
confined in a psychiatric hospital on a succession of petitions by
police and medical personnel, was diagnosed as paranoid
schizophrenic, and was repeatedly interviewed and examined
without prior notice or opportunity to contest the various medical
and legal judgments being made about her by the police, court
personnel, judge, and psychiatrist involved in the case. Eventually
Ms. Lessard hired her own attorney and was conditionally released
under an ongoing 30-day commitment order. Ms. Lessard became
the lead defendant in a class action suit against Wisconsin, alleging
that the state’s procedure for involuntary civil commitment denied
her due process of law. In Lessard, the court agreed with her,
holding that Wisconsin’s statutory commitment procedure violated
procedural due process in a number of respects that paralleled
Gault. Like the statute invalidated in Gault, Wisconsin’s commitment law failed to give detainees adequate notice of proceedings
which could deprive them of the fundamental right of liberty; failed
to mandate a hearing before commitment; failed to provide for the
right to counsel or the right against self-incrimination; permitted
involuntary commitment on an inadequate standard of proof; and
failed to require that those petitioning for commitment consider
less restrictive alternatives before seeking this drastic remedy.35
B. Lessard and the Standard of Dangerousness
In addition to finding numerous procedural due process
errors in the Wisconsin statute, the court in Lessard addressed and
endorsed the need to add dangerousness to the substantive standard
for involuntary civil commitment. The court traced the dangerousness standard back to the 1845 Massachusetts case, Matter of
Josiah Oakes,36 in which the state supreme court held:

34.
35.
36.

Id.
See generally id.
Matter of Josiah Oaks, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845).
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The right to restrain an insane person of his liberty is
found in that great law of humanity, which makes it
necessary to confine those whose going at large
would be dangerous to themselves or others . . . .
And the necessity which creates the law, creates the
limitation of the law. The questions must then arise
in each particular case, whether a patient’s own
safety, or that of others, requires that he should be
restrained for a certain time, and whether restraint is
necessary for his restoration or will be conducive
thereto. The restraint can continue as long as the
necessity continues. This is the limitation, and the
proper limitation.37
The court in Lessard went on to make a point that would become
crucial to the development and application of the dangerousness
standard in the reformed commitment statutes passed during the
seventies. “Unfortunately,” the court noted:
neither the Massachusetts court in Oakes, nor other
courts to follow felt much concern for either a
definition of ‘dangerousness’ or the effects of
deprivations of liberty upon those committed . . . .
The erosion of the common law of dangerousness
continued . . . with the result that many statutes today
permit commitment based upon a wide range of
showings of ‘mental illness.38
It was this perceived defect—the fact that most statutes
allowed involuntary commitment upon a finding of mental illness
and need for treatment, without more and without defining either
“dangerousness” or “mental illness” in ways which clearly limited
such confinement—that the legal advocates for the mentally ill
sought to change in the 1970s. By adding back a vigorous
requirement of dangerousness, making that requirement a separate
element of the commitment standard, and assigning courts the role
of assessing dangerousness as a legally-grounded, rights-focused
37.
38.

Id. at 125, cited in Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1085.
Id. at 1086 (emphasis added).
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element of the standard, advocates hoped to make courts less
deferential to psychiatric findings of “mental illness” and more
attuned to the serious deprivations of liberty inherent in the act of
committing a person to a mental institution against his will.
Three years after the landmark opinion in Lessard, the
United States Supreme Court seemed to drive this point home. In
O’Connor v. Donaldson,39 the Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from forcibly
confining non-dangerous persons who are capable of surviving
“safely” by themselves or with the aid of family and friends.40 In
the decades since that holding, discussion of Donaldson has
focused heavily on the psychology side of the conversation, for
example on the question of what (if anything) the Donaldson Court
said about committed patients’ right to treatment, or what (if
anything) it said about committing mentally ill persons who are not
dangerous but who are deemed “in need of treatment”—for
instance, whose condition may deteriorate if untreated; or who are
mentally ill and lack family and friends to help them maintain a
treatment regimen.41 Here, we look at Donaldson from a rightsfocused perspective.
In January 1957, respondent Kenneth Donaldson was
diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic and was committed to the
Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee. For the next fifteen years,
Donaldson was held at the hospital against his will, despite his
repeated attempts to secure release on the grounds that he was not
dangerous to himself or others; that he was not mentally ill; and
39.
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
40.
Id. at 576 (“In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom
by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or
friends”). The Court vacated and remanded the judgment of the lower court on
other grounds. Id.
41.
See, e.g., Daniel Baldwin, O’Connor v. Donaldson: Involuntary Civil
Commitment and the Right to Treatment, 7 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 573
(1975); L. E. Kopolow, A Review of Major Implications of the O’Connor v.
Donaldson Decision, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 379 (1976); Loren H. Roth,
Mental Health Commitment: The State of the Debate, 31 HOSP. & CMTY.
PSYCHIATRY 385 (1980); O’Connor v. Donaldson, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR.,
available at http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/compnent/content/article/3
41 (calling the Court’s opinion in Donaldson “probably the single most
important decision in mental health law”).
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that he was not receiving treatment at the hospital.42 In 1971,
Donaldson brought suit under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1996),
alleging that hospital superintendent Dr. J.B. O’Connor, and others,
had “intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his
constitutional right to liberty.”43 The jury agreed, awarding Donaldson both compensatory and punitive damages, after being
instructed by the trial judge that it should award punitive damages
only if “the act or omission of the Defendant or Defendants which
proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff was maliciously or
wantonly or oppressively done.”44
The facts of the case powerfully reinforced the dangers of
forcible commitment under a “grave need for treatment” standard.45
Donaldson was hospitalized under a provision of the Florida law
that then allowed such commitment for the purpose of “care,
maintenance, and treatment.”46 Testimony at the trial proved that
Donaldson had never—either before or after he was committed—
posed a danger to himself or others.47 Dr. O’Connor himself
acknowledged that he had neither personal nor second-hand
knowledge of any dangerous act ever committed by Donaldson.48
No evidence showed that Donaldson had ever been a suicide risk,
and one of O’Connor’s codefendants conceded that Donaldson had
earned his own living outside the hospital for fourteen years before
his commitment and that he was capable of supporting himself
outside the hospital. Indeed, immediately after his release from the
hospital in 1971, Donaldson got a responsible job in hospital
administration.49 Further, under the law and regulations at the time,
42.
422 U.S. at 564–65.
43.
Id. at 565.
44.
Id. at 571 n.7.
45.
It is assuredly no coincidence that Bruce Ennis, a leader in the move
to introduce Due Process protections into civil commitment proceedings, argued
the case for Donaldson. Id. at 564. See also supra text accompanying notes 28–
30 (summarizing Ennis’s role in the civil commitment reforms of the 1970s and
1980s).
46.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 565–66 n.2.
47.
Id. at 563
48.
Id. at 568.
49.
Id. Dr. O’Connor had resigned as hospital superintendent by the time
of trial. Shortly after that resignation, Donaldson—with the help of the hospital
staff— successfully secured his release from the hospital—again, after a
confinement of almost fifteen years.
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the hospital staff had the power to release a mentally ill patient who
was not dangerous to self or others. Apparently displeased with
Donaldson’s attempts to be released and his refusal to cooperate
with hospital staff, Dr. O’Connor denied Donaldson’s requests for
such release, even when those requests were supplemented by a
halfway house, Helping Hands, which offered to care for
Donaldson, and by a letter from the respected Minneapolis Clinic
of Psychiatry and Neurology, which supported Donaldson’s
release.50 According to the Supreme Court’s opinion:
O’Connor rejected the offer, replying that
Donaldson could be released only to his parents.
That rule was apparently of O’Connor’s own
making. At the time, Donaldson was 55 years old,
and, as O’Connor knew, Donaldson’s parents were
too elderly and infirm to take responsibility for him.
Moreover, in his continuing correspondence with
Donaldson’s parents, O’Connor never informed
them of the Helping Hands offer.51
O’Connor also rejected an offer of help from a college classmate
and longtime family friend of Donaldson’s, John Lembcke, who
petitioned for Donaldson to be released into his care.52 Dr.
O’Connor testified that he rejected all these requests on the grounds
of his conviction that Donaldson would not have made a
“successful adjustment outside the institution”—but at trial
O’Connor could not remember the basis for that conclusion.53 Dr.
O’Connor characterized Donaldson’s care at the hospital as “milieu
therapy”—custodial care that is not geared toward improving or

50.
Id. (“The [halfway house] request was accompanied by a supporting
letter from the Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, which a
codefendant conceded was a ‘good clinic’”).
51.
Id. at 568–69.
52.
Id. at 569. The Court adds here: “The [trial] record shows that
Lembcke was a serious and responsible person, who was willing and able to
assume responsibility for Donaldson’s welfare.”
53.
Id. at 568.
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curing the patient’s mental illness.54 The conditions on the ward
were hardly conducive to good care: Donaldson was frequently
housed in a large room with 60 other patients, some of whom had
been criminally committed.55 Finally, shortly after Dr. O’Connor
resigned as superintendent of the hospital, Donaldson—with the
help of the hospital staff—successfully petitioned for restoration of
his competency and for his release from involuntary care.56
The facts in Donaldson gave credence to the abolitionist
argument that the law should not permit forcible commitment
based only on the discretionary judgments of mental health
professionals.57 Even assuming that Kenneth Donaldson had been
correctly diagnosed with a serious “mental illness”—about which
the Supreme Court expressed skepticism58—the use of legal
54.
Id. at 569 (“[W]itnesses from the hospital staff conceded that, in the
context of this case, ‘milieu therapy’ was a euphemism for confinement in the
‘milieu’ of a mental hospital”).
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 568.
57.
See, e.g., supra main body text accompanying notes 20−21.
58.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 584 (“There can be little responsible debate
regarding ‘the uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of
professional judgment.’”) (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366,
375 (1956)). The Court’s view echoed a high degree of public skepticism about
the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis at the time. Only two years before the
Court’s decision in Donaldson, psychiatry had been greatly embarrassed by the
publication in Science magazine of the now-famous Rosenhan experiment.
David L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCI. 250 (1973).
Rosenhan sent a group of healthy associates to twelve different mental hospitals
in five states. Id. These pseudo-patients attempted to gain admission to the
hospitals as patients by falsely claiming to suffer from auditory hallucinations.
All were admitted and diagnosed with psychiatric disorders. Id. While in the
hospital, all the patients behaved normally and informed the staff that they felt
fine and were not experiencing any more hallucinations. Id. Nonetheless,
Rosenhan’s pseudopatients spent an average of nineteen days in the hospital. Id.
In order to gain release all were forced to agree to take antipsychotic
medications, and all except one were diagnosed with schizophrenia “in
remission.” Id. The uproar over the Rosenhan experiment was a significant
factor in psychiatry’s subsequent turn toward diagnostic verifiability and
reliability, a move which took center stage in the profession with the publication
of the DSM III in 1980. Id.; see, e.g., Mitchell Wilson, DSM-III and the
Transformation of American Psychiatry: A History, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 399
(1993).
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coercion to enforce the judgment of a psychiatrist, without giving
courts an independent basis on which to question those judgments
and guard the patient’s presumptive right to refuse treatment, put
vulnerable patients at the mercy of psychiatric professionals like
O’Connor, whose judgments could be influenced by personal
pique, personal dislike of a patient, or other reasons not relevant to
the patient’s welfare or legal rights. The hope of reformers was to
give the law an independent basis—the “dangerousness” standard—
upon which to ensure that involuntary commitment was confined to
those mentally ill patients who really posed a serious risk of harm
to themselves or others.
But the apparent victory of legal advocates for the mentally
ill, whose arguments persuaded legislatures across the land to adopt
dangerousness-based standards for involuntary commitment, has
been replaced by a growing sense of failure. Whatever the statutes
said, it soon became clear that in actual court proceedings,
“dangerousness” was often treated either as synonymous with
“mental illness,” or at least as primarily the concern of mental
health professionals. In short, the courts were not using
dangerousness as a way of limiting the reach of involuntary
commitment or of staking the law’s independence from psychiatric
judgments.59
In explaining this failure we should look to the crucial role
played by those in the mainstream clinical community, especially
(1) mental health professionals who evaluate detainees and testify
in court as to their mental health and dangerousness; and (2) judges
who, although charged with the statutory duty of making a final
judgment about whether the law should force someone into
treatment, frequently short-circuited the required legal judgment by
deferring to the medical one.60
59.
See, e.g., Joel Haycock et al., Mediating the Gap: Thinking About
Alternatives to the Current Practice of Civil Commitment, 20 NEW ENG. J.
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 265 (1994) [hereinafter Mediating the Gap]
(discussing “vast formal expansion of procedural and substantive rights [in
involuntary commitment proceedings, which] has led to continually
disappointing results”).
60.
See, e.g., Zander, supra note 1, at 503 (quoting a post-Lessard
dialogue, at an involuntary commitment hearing, between a Milwaukee judge
and defense attorney: Defense attorney: “But I just wonder if we are dealing
with just family emotional-type problems. And, it’s a little difficult for me to
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C. Revolt Against Process—the Pro-Treatment Side Rises
Again
Even in the 1970s, not everyone agreed with lawyer and expatient advocates that involuntary commitment was more evil than
good. The pro-treatment voices were there, though subdued for a
while by the reforms of that era. By the 1980s, however, protreatment forces were on their way back. In 1981, in their editorial
Dangerousness as the Criterion for Involuntary Hospitalization: A
Time to Reassess,61 Pauline Rabin and David Folks passionately
argued for the loosening of the involuntary commitment standard
on the ground that the “dangerousness” criterion prevented doctors
from treating desperately suffering patients:
The present emphasis on dangerousness to self or
others as the sole criterion on which a psychiatrist
can enforce hospitalization of the mentally ill has
been challenged by the physician who is confronted
with an acutely psychotic patient and the social
worker and community agencies on whom the
burden of handling this group now falls . . . . Our
dilemma as physicians is that we are forced to
overlook the acute symptoms of mental illness and
to intervene only if the patient’s behavior can be
characterized as dangerous. The decision to
hospitalize a patient involuntarily for evaluation,
treatment, or both is a legal rather than a medical
determination . . . . Is it not time to reassess the
criteria for emergency involuntary hospitalization?
. . . How can we withhold treatment from an
acutely ill patient? Whose freedom is compromised
by the current standards? . . . Should we not
reintroduce broader options for emergency
understand how full-time inpatient hospitalization at this time would be the cure
. . . .” Court: “I have the same feeling. However, I’m not expert in psychiatric
matters. The experts have testified. My feelings are the same as yours, but I
can’t disregard the expert testimony”).
61.
Rabin & Folks, supra note 15.
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commitment? We strongly urge that a comprehensive review of these questions be undertaken,
directed toward reframing the standards for involuntary commitment while safeguarding the
patient’s fundamental civil rights.62
Considering the subsequent empirical research indicating that the
dangerousness standard had not, in fact, made significant changes
in the rate or substantive proceedings in involuntary commitment
cases, Rabin and Folks’ concerns may seem a bit overheated. The
real significance of these concerns, however, lies not in their
factual accuracy but in the attitude and orientation they reveal—that
of the psychiatrist on the ground, in the emergency room or in the
courtroom, faced with a suffering patient who, in the professional’s
opinion, is in desperate “need of treatment.” While the law and the
legal standard have remained focused on rights and procedures,
many mental health professionals charged with implementing those
standards continue to perceive involuntary commitment through a
“need for treatment” lens. The pro-treatment voice became even
more vocal in the 1980s and 1990s amid the controversies over deinstitutionalization63 and homelessness, which eventually generated
calls for expanded rights to treatment for the mentally ill.64 As one
author characterized the literature in 1994:

62.
Id. at 980.
63.
Deinstitutionalization refers to a set of government policies, during
the mid-late twentieth century, which led to the downsizing or closure of most
psychiatric hospitals nationwide and shrank the number of patients hospitalized
for mental illness from more than 500,000 in 1955 to under 50,000 by 2002. See,
e.g., Tom Jackman, Commitment Rule is Key to Changing the System:
Interpretation of Criteria Varies Among Counties, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2007,
at A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2007/11/ 27/ST2
007112702512.html (“In 1955, 558,239 patients were in public psychiatric
hospitals. By the mid-1990s, the number had dropped to fewer than 72,000. By
2002, the total had fallen below 50,000”).
64.
See, e.g., Haycock et al., supra note 59; Luis R. Marcos, Taking the
Mentally Ill Off the Streets: The Case of Joyce Brown, 20 INT’L J. MENTAL
HEALTH 7, 7 (1991) (“Hardly a section of the country, urban or rural, has
escaped the ubiquitous presence of ragged, ill, and hallucinating human beings,
wandering through our streets, huddled in alleyways, or sleeping over vents. . . .
It now is apparent that a substantial portion of the homeless are chronically and
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Reports on the failure of courts to abide by
procedural and substantive standards, and regular
criticism of that failure from mental health and legal
scholars, have not appreciably advanced the practice
of rights-based civil commitment . . . a number of
practicing clinicians experience substantive and
procedural guarantees as destructive of patients’
treatment needs, and as misguided, one-sided
interference with the treatment of persons with
debilitating mental disorders. The simple reiteration
of patients’ substantive and procedural rights during
a civil commitment hearing has neither ensured
those rights, nor arguably advanced durable
treatment relationships necessary to prevent
rehospitalization.65
It seems that the new standard made no one happy: It failed to
invigorate the legal rights of mentally troubled patients, and it also
raised a substantial obstacle to the effective treatment of patients
who may need, but not want, psychiatric care.
In retrospect, this tension between the legal and psychiatric
perspectives on the standard for involuntary commitment seems
obvious, even inevitable. The two professions—reflected in the two
parts of the standard—come to the policy problem with very
different fears, very different nightmare scenarios. Nightmare #1,
severely mentally ill men and women who in years past would have been longterm residents of state hospitals”).
65.
Haycock et al., supra note 59, at 266:
By far the largest body of literature consists of both
professional and mass media material criticizing the impact
of stringent commitment criteria on the care
of
the
seriously mentally ill . . . . Distressed at the inability of
clinicians to force treatment on thousands of severely
mentally disabled persons, a number of clinicians and
researchers have proposed modifications of procedural
standards [that were] modeled on criminal due process,
[and] a shift away from adversarial hearings, stringent due
process requirements, and strict evidentiary standards.
Id.
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represented by the facts in Donaldson,66 envisions innocent patients
forcibly incarcerated in a mental institution and held there by the
ignorance, arrogance, or personal pique of the staff. By defending
patients’ presumptive right to refuse treatment and subjecting
requests for forcible commitment to vigorous examination by
attorneys and judges, reformers sought to prevent such injustices.
Nightmare #2, expressed in Donald Trefferts’s powerful phrase
Dying With Their Rights On,67 envisions seriously disturbed (even
if not “dangerous”) patients, helpless, unable to feed, clothe, or care
for themselves, and left to languish on the streets because the law is
so focused on protecting their rights that it turns away from their
suffering. Both scenarios suggest real risks for the law. Under a
“need for treatment” standard that relies solely on the judgment of
mental health professionals, the risk is that the standard will give
rise to more Kenneth Donaldsons—patients held in mental
hospitals, for years, against their will while the doctor supposedly
caring for them acts against, rather than for, their interests.68 On the

66.
And in fiction by such characters as Nurse Mildred Ratched in Ken
Kesey’s famous novel, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, KEN KASEY, ONE
FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO’S NEST (1962), and Nurse Davis in the 1948 film THE
SNAKE PIT (Twentieth Century Fox 1948).
67.
Treffert, supra, note 15.
68.
Reports of cases which confirming this fear are not difficult to find.
See, e.g., Alicia Curtis, Involuntary Commitment, BAD SUBJECTS, Dec. 2001,
http://psychrights.orgstates/Maine/InvoluntaryCommitmentbyAliciaCurtis.htm
(Curtis, a psychiatric social worker, reports that “[h]usbands ridding themselves
of wives via the psychiatric institution was still enough of a problem in the
1930s that the first woman in Maine’s legislature, Gail Laughlin, authorized a
bill penalizing husbands for bringing false testimony in the involuntary
commitment hearings of their wives”). More recently Curtis recalls:
I worked with a patient who in the 1960s had been brought to
the hospital by her husband. The chief complaint listed on the
admitting record was: ‘Patient does not do her housework.’ I
think she did actually have a recurrent depression, a symptom
of which was her inability to care for herself and her home,
but here was obviously a large overlap conceptually between
mental illness and not functioning in a prescribed social role.
There is also a large history of the forced treatment of
homosexuality as mental ‘illness.’ One gay man I know has a
familiar story. He was brought, as a teenager, to a psychiatric
hospital in the Midwest by his parents, when they found out he
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other hand, under a vigorous standard which seeks to protect the
presumptive rights of patients to refuse commitment even if doctors
or court personnel see a “need for treatment” or “grave disability,”
the risk is that seriously ill patients, unable to care for themselves
but unwilling to be medicated or hospitalized, will be abandoned
on the streets to be arrested, victimized, or even killed.
For the law, the core issue is which risk to take—or,
alternatively, how to arrange the relevant legal architecture into a
standard that minimizes both risks. The law’s options are limited,
because law in our society is closely bound to the protection of
individual rights. It is the law’s foundational job to protect those
rights and, in the context of involuntary commitment, to treat the
rights of the mentally ill with the same respect as the rights of
others. The law must care about the flawed legal standard which
allowed Kenneth Donaldson to be held against his will for fifteen
years although he had committed no crime and presented no
danger. For the law, any inquiry into involuntary commitment must
begin there. Forcing a person into treatment against her will flies
directly in the face of the individual’s right to refuse medical or
psychiatric treatment whether or not medical professionals agree.69
And where no harm to others is foreseeable or expected, the right
of a respondent to refuse treatment is especially compelling.
Further, once we embark on a course which allows the state to
incarcerate a person against her will on grounds of “danger to self,”
was having gay sex. He was involuntarily committed to the
institutional and treated for his homosexuality.
Id. (The treatment didn’t work). See also Mike Riggs, Lost in the Madhouse:
Three Stories of Involuntary Confinement, THE DAILY CALLER, Jan. 21, 2011,
http://dailycaller.com/2011/01/21/lost-in-the-madhouse-three-stories-of-involunt
ary-confinement (recounting the story of “Eric,” a Florida college student who
in 2008 was involuntary committed, or “Baker Acted” under Florida’s forcible
commitment statutes, apparently on extremely flimsy grounds).
69.
See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“A
finding of ‘mental illness’ alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person up
against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement.
Assuming that that term can be given a reasonably precise content and that the
‘mentally ill’ can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no
constitutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are
dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom”). See also A. Stone, The
Right to Refuse Treatment: Why Psychiatrists Should and Can Make it Work,
38(3) ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358 (1981).
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the definitional question—what constitutes an actionable danger
under the standard—becomes both vitally important, and
enormously difficult, to resolve coherently.
Can the reigning conceptions of “mental illness” and
“dangerousness” resolve this issue? If we define “danger to self” in
the usual way—as “posing a significant risk of serious physical
harm” to oneself—then adventurers like Steve Fossett, who engage
in risky activities because they love to confront and overcome the
risk, are just as committable as the depressed person who drinks
poison with the express purpose of ending his life. But should the
concept be defined so expansively? And if not, does the “mental
illness” prong of the test establish a rationally defensible boundary
line?
III. REDEFINING “DANGER TO SELF”
Consider the following three scenarios. Scenario One: Alice
has decided to kill herself and proceeds to the roof of her twentystory apartment building, intending to jump off. Alarmed bystanders grab Alice just as she jumps, pull her to safety, and phone
the police who deliver her to the psychiatric wing of a nearby
hospital. Despite Alice’s clearly expressed wish to be released from
the hospital so that she can accomplish her own death, her
concerned family petitions the court to have her forcibly committed
on grounds of danger to self.
Scenario Two: Bruce70 is a senior partner at a large urban
law firm. Bruce works seven-day, eighty-hour weeks, and has
always believed that his life is his work. Bruce suffers a major
heart attack and is informed by his doctors that unless he
dramatically reduces his workload and stress level, he will almost
certainly suffer a second and fatal heart attack in the near future.
Despite Bruce’s clearly expressed preference to return to work at
his normal pace, his concerned family petitions the court to have
him committed on grounds of danger to self.
Scenario Three: Christopher70 suffers from atherosclerotic
dementia, a condition that causes periods of confusion interspersed
70.
The characters of “Bruce” and “Christopher” are renamed versions of
cases described in Alan Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: “A Knife
that Cuts Both Ways,” 51 J UDICATURE 370, 375 (1968) (discussing the cases of
“Mrs. Lake” and of Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson).
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with periods of rationality. Christopher is neither suicidal nor
dangerous to others. He has no close family or friends, and lives
alone. One night the police find him wandering the streets,
confused but not endangering anyone. They bring Christopher to
the psychiatric wing of the local hospital and petition the court to
have him committed for treatment. At the commitment hearing
Christopher petitions for release and coherently testifies that he
knows about his illness, understands its risks, but that he has spent
time in a psychiatric facility before and prefers to take the risk of
living on his own rather than be hospitalized again.
First, consider Scenario Three. Should the law grant the
petition and commit Christopher for treatment against his will? In
more than half the states the law permits forcible commitment not
only in cases where a court finds a mentally ill respondent to be
dangerousness to self or others, but also in cases involving mental
illness and grave disability or need for treatment.71 But what should
“count” as a grave disability? The law must have a role in deciding
this because the answer determines when courts may overrule the
express preference of a respondent not to be hospitalized (or
forcibly treated, for example with drugs, on an outpatient basis).
By hypothesis, Christopher is not “dangerous” in the sense
that he intends to do violence either to other people or himself. But
the answer to the “grave disability” question must nonetheless
depend on a concept, which is closely related to dangerousness—
the concept of harm, or risk of harm, to self. Christopher’s
dementia, while not disposing him toward violent behavior, risks
self-harm in the sense that he might, in a confused state, be unable
to provide for his own basic needs or wander into a dangerous
situation where he is vulnerable to assault by violent others. Should
that kind of risk be a proper basis on which to overrule
Christopher’s clearly expressed desire not to be treated for his
dementia?

71.
See, e.g., Legal Resources in Your State: Maine, TREATMENT
ADVOC. CTR., http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=215&Itemid=150 (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (noting
that Maine is one of twenty-three states whose involuntary treatment standard is
based on a person’s “need for treatment” rather than only the person’s likelihood
of being dangerous to self or others).
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To answer that, we need to know what risk of harm means
in the involuntary commitment context; what kinds of risk, and of
risked harm, should “count” for purposes of evaluating someone
under the standard;72 and what degree of harm, or risk of harm,
justifies a court in acting against a respondent’s desire not to be
treated. “Grave disability,” in this sense, is another name for
“danger to self.”73 Assessing such disability necessarily involves
assessing the degree of harm, or risk of harm, to the self if the
respondent is not hospitalized/forcibly treated. In this important
sense, investigating the content of the “danger to self” standard is
conceptually prior to defining the boundaries of the “grave
disability” one.
How, then, should the law of involuntary commitment view
the two “danger to self” cases of Alice and Bruce? Should the law
treat those two cases the same, or differently? If the same, should a
court force both Alice and Bruce into treatment, or neither? If the
two cases call for different legal dispositions, what would justify
that result, and which way should the relevant differences cut? By
analyzing the range of possible answers to these questions, this Part
illuminates some problems with the “danger to self” rule and
articulates the basis for a fairer, more just standard, one which
holds true to the legal values which necessarily arise when a person
is forced into treatment against his will.
In the cases of Alice and Bruce, four resolutions are
possible. First, the court could grant both commitment petitions,
forcing both respondents into treatment. Second, the court could
deny both petitions, refusing to force either respondent into
treatment. In choosing either of these two options, the court would
be treating Bruce and Alice the same for purposes of involuntary
commitment.
Alternatively, the two petitions should be decided
differently, an option that offers the third and fourth possible
resolutions. Thus, the petition for involuntary commitment could be

72.
For example, what about alcohol abuse? Consider the case of “Dan”
that opened this Article. See supra text accompanying note 2.
73.
And some courts have expressly defined grave disability in those
terms. See, e.g., Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. 983, 991 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (grave
disability “implicitly requires a finding of harm to self”).
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granted as to Alice but not as to Bruce, or it could be granted as to
Bruce but not as to Alice.
The next Section considers these four options.
A. An Abolitionist Premise
Again: In a legal system that takes individual rights
seriously, the law must always have good reason to overrule a
person’s desire to be left alone. Thus, we begin with the premise
that unless there is good reason to force Alice, Bob, or both into
treatment, neither one should be committed against their will.
Further discussion becomes necessary only if we determine that the
abolitionist position is wrong—only if there are in fact cases where
the law clearly should order someone to be committed despite their
contrary preference.
Against that conceptual backdrop, what should happen to
Alice and Bruce? The abolitionist premise would dictate that
neither respondent should be forced into treatment. Should the
court, then, deny both petitions?
Consider this response: The cases of Alice and Bruce are
not similarly situated; in fact they are polar opposites. Alice, who
attempted suicide, represents the paradigm case in which a
respondent should be forcibly committed, while Bruce, the
workaholic, represents an equally obvious case in which the law
should respect the respondent’s preference not to receive treatment—in which the family’s petition for commitment should be
denied. What might justify this view? To answer we need to think
more deeply about what the commitment standard is, and to what
factual situations it applies.
Three core elements animate the “danger to self” standard:
that, absent intervention: (1) There is a risk of serious harm to the
self, (2) there is a high degree of likelihood that the harm will
occur, and (3) the threatened harm is imminent, will occur within a
very short time. Alice’s case satisfies all three elements. There is a
risk of serious self-harm from failing to hospitalize Alice—if she is
not forcibly hospitalized she will probably die by her own hand.
Second, Alice’s behavior on the roof demonstrated a firm
determination to kill herself, and she continues to demand that she
be released so that she can try again. Thus, there is a high degree of
likelihood that the serious harm in question—Alice’s death by
suicide—will occur if Alice is not forcibly committed. And third,
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Alice’s recent behavior indicates that this serious and likely harm is
imminent—if she is not hospitalized Alice will try to kill herself
again very soon.
It seems to follow that Alice is among the most compelling
cases for forcible confinement of a person on grounds of “danger to
self.” Such cases involve respondents who are likely to inflict
imminent death or serious bodily harm upon themselves in the
absence of intervention. In this context the phrase “danger to self”
is a summary way of describing the factors of (1) threatened
serious harm, (2) high probability of such harm, and (3) imminence
of such harm.
If this is correct, then the three criteria are sufficient to
justify hospitalization against the respondent’s will. Are these
criteria also necessary to justify such commitment? Would
dropping any one of the three elements sink the case for
involuntary commitment below the normative threshold at which
the law is justified in overriding a person’s presumptive right not to
be incarcerated against her will?
A brief thought experiment will test this out. First consider
element (1), and suppose that the imminent threatened harm from
not hospitalizing a respondent is far less serious than the person’s
death. If the respondent was captured not while attempting to kill
herself but while lying on a summer beach without sunscreen, few
would feel comfortable incarcerating her against her will for
attempting to inflict such “harm” on herself. The harm must be
serious, amounting to a threat of death or serious self-injury.
The same is true for element (2). Even a person who has
threatened to do serious and imminent harm to herself will not be
forcibly committed if the likelihood he will actually do the harm is
not very high. In fact mental health professionals make this kind of
judgment all the time. Does a depressed client who says he wants
to die really mean to kill himself, or is he merely using references
to death as a means of expressing the sadness, emptiness, and
hopelessness he feels while experiencing a very black mood? If the
former, presumably the person is a candidate for hospitalization; if
the latter, presumably not. The degree of likelihood that the serious
and imminent harm will occur is an indispensable element of the
calculus.
Finally, the case for forcible commitment would fall below
the requisite threshold if the threatened danger to self is admittedly
serious and credible, but is not imminent—not about to happen in
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the immediate future. Consider the case of a forty-year-old person
who has an inordinate fear of aging. The person believes that life
has no meaning after age fifty, and she tells her therapist that she
intends to kill herself on the night before her fiftieth birthday. Even
if the client’s intent is real and the therapist believes her, the
therapist lacks adequate cause to have the patient forcibly
committed now, because although the client may very well follow
through on the threat at the time she indicates, the ten-year delay
between threat and time of harm would, and should, defeat any
effort to have the person hospitalized against her will. The factor of
imminence, in this sense, is a way of assuring that the threatened
danger to self is almost certain to occur, right now, unless the
person is hospitalized. Understood in this way, the imminence
requirement can be seen as an adjunct to the likelihood element—
both seek to limit the law of involuntary commitment to cases in
which failing to commit someone involuntarily will almost
certainly lead to serious injury or death of that person.
The three elements—serious harm to self, high likelihood/
probability of such harm in the absence of hospitalization, and
imminence of the harm—are thus both necessary and sufficient to
commit a person involuntarily on grounds of danger to self. In the
case of Alice, all three exist, and this explains the intuition that
Alice is a proper candidate for forcible commitment on grounds of
danger to self.74
But consider that the above test may come out exactly the
same way in Bruce’s case as it does in Alice’s. As to element (1),
risk of serious harm to self, Bruce’s case is quite similar to Alice’s.
Like Alice, Bruce’s choice to refuse treatment carries the serious
and foreseeable (actually foreseen) risk of his own death. As for
element (2), the likelihood element, there may be a difference
between Alice and Bruce—on the other hand, there may not. People
sometimes live much longer than their doctors expect them to. But
severely depressed people sometimes behave in unpredicted ways.
Statistics indicate, for example, that between eighty-five and
ninety-five percent of people who attempt suicide are still alive

74.
Some state statutes also contain requirements that (1) treatment be
available and/or that (2) the patient is likely to benefit from such treatment. See,
e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW 9.60(C).
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fifteen years later.75 Statistics also indicate that the five-year
survival rate from congestive heart failure is only fifty percent—
half of those who suffer massive heart attacks die of heart failure
within five years of diagnosis.76 The difference in likelihood of
serious and imminent harm between Alice and Bruce may be
negligible, or even non-existent. Further, even if there is some
difference here, we can’t know that Bruce’s case falls below the
likelihood threshold unless and until we know what that threshold
is.77 Just how likely must the threat of serious and imminent harm
to self be in order to justify involuntary commitment? On its face
the “danger to self” standard offers no answer to this. It should.
Finally, with respect to element (3), the imminence
criterion, again no necessary difference divides the cases of Alice
and Bruce. In the real-life scenario on which Bruce’s hypothetical
case is based—that of Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson—the
patient (Justice Jackson) suffered a serious heart attack; was
warned that if he continued his demanding work schedule that he
risked a fatal heart attack at any time; and in fact suffered a fatal
heart attack shortly after he rejected the advice of his doctors and
returned to his pre-illness schedule.78 The harm to self was in fact
imminent, as Jackson’s doctors had warned him. Once again, even
if this were not clear, we can’t know whether the threatened selfharm in Bruce’s case is imminent enough to justify forcing him
into treatment until we know what the threshold level of imminence
actually is.
75.
Catherine E. Bonn, Suicide and the State: The Ethics of Involuntary
Hospitalization for Suicidal Patients, 3 INTERSECT 40, 44 (2010), available at
http://ojs.stanford.edu/ojs/index.php/intersect/article/view/197/101 [hereinafter
Bonn, Suicide and the State].
76.
See, e.g., Statistics: Heart Failure, HEART AND STROKE FOUNDATION
OF CANADA, http://www.heartandstroke.com/site/c.ikIQLcMWJtE/b.3483991/k.
34A8/Statistic.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2104).
77.
In his perceptive article Psychiatry in the Legal Process, Alan M.
Dershowitz made this point in 1968. Dershowitz, supra note 17, at 376
(discussing an “important question which rarely gets asked in the civil
commitment process: how likely should the predicted event have to be to justify
preventive incarceration? Even if it is agreed, for example, that preventing a
serious physical assault would justify incarceration, an important question still
remains: how likely should it have to be that the person will assault before
incarceration is justified?”).
78.
Id. at 375.
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Thus, if the three-pronged “dangerousness” test justifies the
involuntary commitment of Alice, then forcing Bruce into treatment too may be at least equally legitimate.
But consider a second intuition, which seems to distinguish
the cases of Alice and Bruce: a difference in their intent. One
factual difference between Alice’s case and Bruce’s is that at the
time her family petitions the court to have her forcibly committed,
Alice has the conscious purpose and the primary intent of causing
the serious, likely, and imminent harm in question—her own death.
On the other hand Bruce’s course of action, although in fact it
poses a high risk of his death and Bruce knows of that risk, was
chosen despite that risk, not because of it. Is the presence of
conscious purpose in Alice’s case, and its absence in Bruce’s, a
valid basis on which to grant the family’s petition for commitment
as to Alice and deny it as to Bruce?
The answer must be no. To the extent that Alice’s intent to
cause her own death makes it more likely that she will accomplish
that result, or makes the result more imminent, perhaps such intent
should be relevant to the court’s decision in her case (and, by
reference, perhaps the absence of such intent should count as one
factor in favor of denying the family’s petition in Bruce’s case)
under the three prongs of the dangerousness standard. But intent
alone is not a valid basis for distinguishing between Alice and
Bruce. A moment’s thought makes this clear and also moves the
discussion in an important new direction.
The fundamental question in “danger to self” cases is
whether the state has adequate reason to override the person’s
preference not to seek treatment. Intent to cause harm to oneself,
even a drastic harm like one’s own death, does not offer adequate
reason to override that preference. The reason is that we can easily
imagine situations in which a person’s choice to end her own life is
rational; makes sense; is supported by reasons we can understand
and with which we can sympathize (though of course we might
ultimately disagree with it on religious or moral grounds). In
Alice’s case, for example, what we need to know is not merely that
she intends to kill herself, but why. If Alice intends to end her life
because she believes that Martians have invaded her town and are
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planning to kidnap and transport her to another planet,79 a fate
worse than death, then (for all except abolitionists) Alice’s
delusional motive for wanting to kill herself might give the state
adequate reason to step in and prevent her from carrying out her
suicide plan. On the other hand, if Alice wants to end her own life
because she is in the end-stage of an incurable and excruciatingly
painful form of cancer and has been told by her doctors that there is
nothing they can do either to prolong her life or to diminish the
suffering she will experience as the disease progresses further, then
this is a rational and understandable motive which might merit
respect from the state and the courts—whatever the nature of the
contemplated self-harm, its likelihood, and/or its imminence.80
79.
Unfortunately, such cases do happen. For example, in 1998 Russell
Weston shot and killed two Capitol Hill police officers in the United States
Capitol. Weston, who had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia some
years before the killings, shot the officers because he believed they were
blocking access to a device which would stop the United States from being
annihilated by cannibals. See, e.g., Bill Miller, Capitol Shooter’s Mind-Set
Detailed, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1999, at A1, available at http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/shooting/stories/weston042399.htm
(“Russell Eugene Weston Jr. told a court-appointed psychiatrist that he stormed
the U.S. Capitol last summer, killing two police officers, to prevent the United
States from being annihilated by disease and legions of cannibals. ‘He described
his belief that time was running out and that if he did not come to Washington,
D.C., he would become infected with Black Heva,’ wrote Sally C. Johnson, the
psychiatrist who examined Weston last fall. Weston called this imaginary
ailment the ‘most deadliest disease known to mankind’ and said it was spread by
the rotting corpses of cannibals’ victims, Johnson wrote. Weston told Johnson
he went to the Capitol to gain access to what he called ‘the ruby satellite,’ a
device he said was kept in a Senate safe. That satellite, he insisted, was the key
to putting a stop to cannibalism”). See also Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 743
(2006) (discussing defendant Eric Clark’s “undisputed paranoid schizophrenia”
at the time he shot and killed a police officer). Witnesses testified that
paranoid delusions led Clark to rig a fishing line with beads
and wind chimes at home to alert him to intrusion by invaders,
and to keep a bird in his automobile to warn of airborne
poison. There was lay and expert testimony that Clark thought
Flagstaff was populated with ‘aliens’ (some impersonating
government agents), the ‘aliens’ were trying to kill him, and
bullets were the only way to stop them.
Id. at 745.
80.
See, e.g., Bonn, Suicide and the State, supra note 75.
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Notice that the same analysis applies to Bruce. If Bruce
chooses to continue working at his pre-heart attack pace because he
delusionally believes that his doctors and his family are plotting his
murder and his only chance of escape is to remain at the office,81
that irrational motive might justify state intervention and forced
treatment. But if Bruce’s choice to reject his doctors’ advice and
continue to work is based on his belief that work is the most
valuable thing in his life—or even (is this a closer case?) that all
doctors are quacks and his own judgment about his health is more
reliable than theirs—then, while we might personally disagree with
his decision, the motive behind it is comprehensible and not
irrational in the same sense as it would be in the first scenario. In
that instance, perhaps, the state should respect Bruce’s decision.
But if this analysis is correct, it dramatically shifts the
argument. What now becomes crucial to the legal standard of
involuntary commitment is not the three elements of
dangerousness, but the reasons offered by the respondent for
wanting to harm himself. The nature and coherence of those
reasons—not merely the characteristics of the harm—emerge as
81.
Again, such events do occur. For example, seventeen-year-old Eric
Clark murdered a police officer and then challenged Arizona’s insanity defense
on constitutional grounds in Clark v. Arizona. Clark, 548 U.S. 735. Clark had
previously been diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic and had come to believe
that his own parents were aliens and that he was in constant danger of being
attacked or killed. See, e.g., Was Eric Clark Insane or Just Troubled?, CNN,
April 15, 2008, available at http://sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2
006 /0426_14_cnn.pdf; John Gibeaut, A Matter Over Mind, A.B.A. J. , Apr. 22,
2006, available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_matter_over_
mind (“‘It started with the water,’ David [Clark, Eric’s father] says. Terry
[Clark, Eric’s mother] explains:
He thought it contained lead. He thought he was going to be
poisoned, and we couldn’t convince him otherwise.’ Then
came the aliens. Clark believed that Flagstaff had been
invaded by them, and that he and the city were in danger.
Though he still recognized David and Terry as his parents, he
also believed they were aliens. ‘But he couldn’t tell us who
they were or why we would be in danger,’ David says. He
recalls his son’s matter-of-fact response when he asked Eric
how he knew his parents were aliens: He said, ‘Bring me some
tools and I’ll show you.’
Id.
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central to the legitimacy of state coercion. Thus, in addition to a
dangerousness component consisting of the three-pronged analysis
outlined above, a defensible involuntary commitment standard
contains a “rational motive” or “rational capacity” requirement
commanding the state to uphold a respondent’s decision to forego
psychiatric treatment unless and until the state affirmatively
concludes that the respondent lacks the capacity to rationally
deliberate about his own situation and to articulate reality-based
reasons for his decision not to seek treatment.
But the current standard for involuntary commitment does
not require that the respondent fail a rational motive/capacity test.
Instead, (in addition to a finding of dangerousness) it requires that a
respondent suffer from “mental illness.”82 Is the presence of
“mental illness” an accurate proxy for the lack of reasoning and
deliberative capacity that could justify committing someone against
their will? Section B engages that question.
B. Mental Illness As Grounds for Involuntary Commitment
If the term “mental illness” refers only to cases in which a
respondent’s thinking is so disordered that (s)he is unable to assess
the risks and benefits of hospitalization, and/or to articulate a
rational basis for declining treatment, then there is no gap between
the actual standard and the rational basis one. Thus, clarifying the
relevant meaning of “mental illness” is a crucial step in the
analysis.
1. The Problem of Definition
How, then, is “mental illness” defined for purposes of
involuntary commitment? A first response is to consult psychiatry
and psychology and to borrow their conception of the term. But this
turns out to be quite difficult, in large part because psychiatric and

82.
See, e.g., State Standards for Assisted Treatment: Civil Commitment
Criteria for Inpatient or Outpatient Psychiatric Treatment, TREATMENT ADVOC.
CTR., Jan. 2013, http://www.treatmentcenter.org/storage/documents/Standards_
The_Text_June_2011.pdf (“All states and the District of Columbia have laws
governing court-ordered hospital (inpatient) commitment of individuals with
severe mental illness . . .”).

2014

Mental Illness and Danger to Self

291

psychological terms are formed for very different purposes than are
legal ones.
As a first try, we might refer the concept of mental illness to
the “bible” of psychiatric diagnosis—the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).83 The DSM is produced by
the American Psychiatric Association and is the most widely
accepted diagnostic instrument among clinicians in the United
States of America.84 DSM-5 defines “mental disorder” as “a
syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an
individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects
a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental
processes underlying mental functioning.”85 DSM-IV-TR and
DSM-5 include more than 300 possible diagnoses, ranging from
psychological conditions which are universally viewed as serious
(such as major depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia) to
conditions (for example, “impairment in written expression,”86
83.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM5]. The most recent version of the manual, DSM-5, took effect in May 2013.
Most of the statutes and cases discussed in this Article were enacted during
earlier versions of DSM. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed., text
rev. 2000) [hereinafter, DSM-IV-TR]; see also Allen Frances, Op-Ed.,
Diagnosing the DSM, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2012, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/opinion/break-up-the-psychiatric-monopoly.html
?_r=0 (evaluating “revisions to what is often called the ‘bible of psychiatry’–the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or D.S.M.”).
84.
See, e.g., Marcia C. Peck & Richard M. Scheffler, An Analysis of the
Definitions of Mental Illness Used in State Parity Laws, 53 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 1089 (Sept. 2002).
85.
DSM-5, supra note 83, at 20.
86.
Id. at 67 (a form of “Specific Learning Disorder” characterized by
problems in spelling accuracy, grammar and punctuation accuracy, and clarity or
organization of written expression). In DSM-IV-TR, “Disorder of Written
Expression” defined as follows:
A. Writing skills, as measured by individually
administered standardized tests (or functional
assessments of writing skills), are substantially below
those expected given the person’s chronological age,
measured intelligence, and age-appropriate education.
B. The disturbance in Criterion A significantly interferes
with academic achievement or activities of daily living
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“impairment in mathematics”87 and “caffeine intoxication”88)
which seem much less disabling to the threshold capacities for
deliberation and reason that are at issue here. In short, the range of
conditions to which DSM attaches the word “disorder” is quite
wide, including at one end of the spectrum the schizophrenic
person who suffers from psychotic delusions and hallucinations,89
that require the composition of written texts (e.g.,
writing grammatically correct sentences and organized
paragraphs).
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 56.
87.
Id. (a form of Specific Learning Disorder characterized by problems
with memorization of arithmetic facts, accurate or fluent calculation, number
sense, and accurate math reasoning). In DSM-IV-TR, “Mathematics Disorder” is
defined as follows:
A. Mathematical ability, as measured by individually
administered standardized tests, is substantially below that
expected given the person’s chronological age, measured
intelligence, and age-appropriate education.
B. The disturbance in Criterion A significantly interferes with
academic achievement or activities of daily living that
require mathematical ability.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 54.
88.
Id. at 503 (recent consumption of high dose caffeine which is
accompanied or followed by signs/symptoms, such as restlessness, nervousness,
excitement, insomnia, psychomotor agitation.) See also DSM-IV-TR, supra note
83, at 232 (defining “Caffeine-induced Sleep Disorder”). A Caffeine-Induced
Sleep Disorder is a variant of Substance-Induced Sleep Disorder characterized
by the following:
A.
A prominent disturbance in sleep that is sufficiently
severe to warrant independent clinical attention.
B.
There is evidence from the history, physical
examination, or laboratory findings of (1) or (2): (1)
the symptoms in Criterion A developed during, or
within a month of, [Caffeine] Intoxication or
Withdrawal . . . .
C.
The disturbance is not better accounted for by a Sleep
Disorder that is not [caffeine] induced.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 660.
89.
See, e.g., DSM-5, supra note 83, at 87–88 (Schizophrenia Spectrum
and Other Psychotic Disorders characterized by “key features” including
delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized thinking). See also DSM-IV-TR,
supra note 83 (Defining schizophrenia). Schizophrenia in relevant part, is
defined as follows:
A.
Characteristic symptoms: Two (or more) of the following,
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and at the other end the person whose over-consumption of coffee
or soda interferes with his sleep. Indeed, recent research suggests
that almost half the U.S. population will meet the criteria for a
DSM diagnosis during their lifetimes.90 Although DSM explicitly
cautions that its diagnostic categories “may not be wholly relevant
to legal judgments,”91 many states and the federal government have
each present for a significant portion of time during a 1-month
period (or less if successfully treated). At least one of these
should include 1, 2, or 3. (1) delusions; (2) hallucinations; (3)
disorganized speech; (4) grossly abnormal psychomotor
behavior, including catatonia; (5) negative symptoms, e.g.,
diminished emotional expression or avolition.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 312.
90.
According to Ronald Kessler, Professor of Health Care Policy at
Harvard Medical School, almost half the United States population becomes
“eligible” for a DSM-IV diagnosis at some point in their lives. See, e.g., Wynne
Parry, “Normal or Not? New Psychiatric Manual Stirs Controversy,”
LIVESCIENCE.COM, May 19, 2013, www.livescience.com/34496-psychiatricmanual-stirs-controversy (“More than 46 percent of the U.S. population will
meet the criteria for at least one DSM-IV diagnosis during their lifetimes,
according to research published by [Kessler and his colleague Philip Wang]”).
91.
The phrase is from the Cautionary Statement in DSM-IV-TR, supra
note 83, at xxxvii.
The Cautionary Statement’s purpose is to provide clear
descriptions of diagnostic categories in order to enable
clinicians and investigators to diagnose, communicate
about, study, and treat people with various mental disorders.
It is to be understood that inclusion here, for clinical and
research purposes, of a diagnostic category such as Pathological Gambling or Pedophilia does not imply that the
condition meets legal or other nonmedical criteria for what
constitutes mental disease, mental disorder, or mental
disability. The clinical and scientific considerations involved in categorization of these conditions as mental
disorders may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments, for
example, that take into account such issues as individual
responsibility, disability determination, and competency.
Id. DSM-5, supra note 83 at 25 also contains a “Cautionary Statement for
Forensic Use of DSM-5,” which states in relevant part:
Although the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria and text are
primarily designed to assist clinicians in conducting clinical
assessment, case formulation, and treatment planning,
DSM-5 is also used as a reference for the courts and
attorneys in assessing the forensic consequences of mental
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used the manual as the definitional referent in legislation relevant
to “mental illness” in a variety of contexts.92
Of course DSM categories are primarily designed to detect
mental disorders for the purpose of treating them. And in that
context—a context in which there is no question of weighing the
costs of rights violations against the benefits of psychological
treatment—they make perfect sense. If diagnosis and treatment are
the goals, then defining “mental illness” should be about
identifying treatable conditions whether or not they involve
dangerous or risky behavior.
That changes radically, however, in a legal setting where a
respondent’s very freedom may depend on the presence or absence
of a diagnosable “mental illness.” The problem is made more acute
by the ambiguity surrounding causation in those state commitment
statutes which set out the two elements—“dangerous to self or
others” and “mental illness”—without specifying any particular
causal relationship between them.93 Must the diagnosed “mental
illness” or “mental disorder” be the primary cause of the
disorders. As a result, it is important to note that the
definition of mental disorder included in DSM-5 was
developed to meet the needs of clinicians, public health
professionals, and research investigators rather than all of
the technical needs of the courts and legal professionals.
Id. The statement goes on to say that DSM-5 diagnostic categories can be useful
to courts and legislatures, “[f]or example, when the presence of a mental
disorder is the predicate for a subsequent legal determination (e.g., involuntary
civil commitment).” Id. Of course the question addressed here is whether the
legal standard for involuntary commitment should contain a predicate that
renders the law dependent on the conception of “mental disorder” developed by
the mental health profession. I argue that it should not.
92.
See, e.g., Peck & Scheffler, supra note 84, at 1090 (making the point
that in federal legislation the phrase “mental illness” has been interpreted to
include all disorders in the D.S.M.).
93.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-498(c) (West 2009)(stating
“. . . If, on such hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the person complained of has psychiatric disabilities and is dangerous to himself
or herself or others . . . it shall make an order for his or her commitment,
considering whether or not a less restrictive placement is available, to a hospital
for psychiatric disabilities”). See also id. § 17a-495(a) (stating that “dangerous
to himself or herself or others’ means there is a substantial risk that physical
harm will be inflicted by an individual upon his or her own person or upon
another person. . . .).
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respondent’s dangerous behavior? If not, then courts, perhaps
convinced of a respondent’s dangerousness, might be tempted to
force the person into treatment as long as any mental illness can be
identified by the court psychologist or psychologist. Suppose, for
example, the respondent threatens to harm himself, and also
happens to suffer from mathematics disorder or disorder of written
expression. Can the court commit him for treatment whether or not
the disorder is a causal factor in the respondent’s behavior or
treatment preferences? Or suppose the respondent undoubtedly has
a serious mental illness—suffers from schizophrenia and is actively
psychotic at the time of the petition. Should the presence of an
active psychosis suffice to satisfy not only the mental illness
requirement but also the requirement of dangerousness?94 These are
core questions for the law, questions that the treatment-focused
diagnostic categories of psychiatry cannot (and were not intended
to) answer.
2. In Search of a Legally Intelligible Standard
On two variants of the abolitionist view, either (1) there is
no such thing as “mental illness” and those who defend involuntary
commitment based on that concept are agents of social oppression
94.
See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 17, at 374. The involuntary
commitment statutes
authorize preventive incarceration of mentally ill persons
who are likely to injure themselves or others. Generally,
‘injure’ is not further defined in the statutes or in the case
law, and the critical decision—whether a predicted pattern
of behavior is sufficiently injurious [in today’s terms,
“dangerous”] to warrant incarceration—is relegated to the
psychiatrist’s unarticulated judgments. Some psychiatrists
are perfectly willing to provide their own personal
opinions—often falsely disguised as expert opinions–about
which harms are sufficiently serious. One psychiatrist
recently told a meeting of the American Psychiatric
Association that ‘you’—the psychiatrist—have to define for
yourself the word danger, and then having decided that in
your mind. . . look for it with every conceivable means. . .
Id. The Dershowitz article was published in the late 1960s. Has the reformed
“dangerousness” standard that took hold in the 1970s and 1980s sufficiently
strengthened the rights of patients since then? This Article suggests that the
answer is “no.”
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against the different and the powerless;95 or (2) even if “mental
illness” does exist, the mentally ill should be treated in exactly the
same manner as others for purposes of involuntary commitment.96
Absent a previous or impending criminal charge, civil preventive
detention on grounds of dangerousness alone is strongly disfavored
in the law.97 Abolitionists believe that the preferences of mentally
disordered people should be accorded equal respect—that their
choice to refuse psychiatric treatment should be as dispositive as it
would be for any person.98 Thus, abolitionists would argue that
even a severely depressed respondent who is openly suicidal should
not be forced into treatment despite her continuing and clearly
serious wish to kill herself. If that suicidal person is released
without treatment and then kills herself, a true abolitionist argues
95.
See generally, from opposite ends of the political spectrum: (1) the
views of Thomas Szasz, SZASZ, supra note 28; and (2) the views of R.D. Laing,
R.D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 1, 118–40 (1967).
96.
See, e.g., Rabin & Folks, supra note 15, at 990 (describing this
abolitionist view).
97.
See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on
Preventive Detention, 76 B.U.L REV. 113, 114 (1996) (“The strong presumption
against preventive detention and the relatively limited means to accomplish it
ensure that, in absolute terms, the dangerous undetainables are vastly greater in
number than the dangerous detainables . . . .”). The state’s power of preventive
detention has greatly expanded when founded upon a pre-existing criminal
charge, or prior criminal history of a defendant. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson,
Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429–30 (2001). Laypersons have traditionally
thought of the criminal justice system as being in the business of doing justice:
punishing offenders for the crimes they commit. Yet during the past several
decades, the justice system’s focus has shifted from punishing past crimes to
preventing future violations through the incarceration and control of dangerous
offenders. Habitual-offender laws, such as “three strikes” laws, authorize life
sentences for repeat offenders . . . “Sexual predator” statutes provide for the civil
detention of sexual offenders who remain dangerous at the conclusion of their
criminal commitment. New sentencing guidelines increase the sentence of
offenders with criminal histories because these offenders are seen as the most
likely to commit future crimes. These reforms boast as their common
denominator greater official control over dangerous persons, a rationale readily
apparent from each reform’s legislative history. Id. (citations omitted).
98.
See, e.g., Paul Chodoff, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally
Ill as a Moral Issue, 141 A M . J. P SYCHIATRY 384 (1984) (contrasting the stance
of “medical model” with that of civil libertarians on the issue of involuntary
commitment).
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that this potential consequence must be accepted as a cost of
respecting the civil rights of the mentally disordered—just as we
ought to respect the right of Justice Jackson to continue a stressful
work schedule despite the knowledge that doing so risks his
demise, or the right of adventurers such as Steve Fossett who
choose to go solo ballooning around the world because they love
and embrace the risk.
To be sure, even some who are generally sympathetic to the
abolitionist perspective balk at the prospect of releasing an actively
psychotic respondent (for example, a delusional schizophrenic who
plans to jump from a building because he believes he will sprout
wings and fly) without treatment. In his perceptive essay What is
So Special About Mental Illness?,99 the philosopher Joel Feinberg
articulated a quasi-abolitionist position, which incorporates this
exception. According to Feinberg, when a person’s mental illness
“so affect[s] the cognitive processes that [s]he is unable to make
inferences or decisions,”100 the state may exercise its “sovereign
power of guardianship”101 in the person’s behalf and force the
person into treatment.
On its face, Feinberg’s standard—which would make only
those mental disorders which render the person “unable to make
inferences or decisions” a proper basis for involuntary commitment—sounds a lot like the rational motive standard articulated
above. But Feinberg then further defines the standard in a way that
draws a bright, but inaccurate, line between cognitive disorders,
which he argues can serve as psychological predicates for state
intervention against a person’s preferences, and “emotional” or
“volitional” disorders, which should not. Feinberg states:
By no means all mentally ill persons . . . suffer from
defects of reason. Many or most of them suffer
from emotional or volitional disorders that leave
their cognitive faculties quite unimpaired. To
impose compulsory therapy on such persons would
be as objectionably paternalistic as imposing
99.

Joel Feinberg, What Is So Special About Mental Illness?, in DOING
272 (1970).
Id. at 279.
Id.

AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY

100.
101.
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involuntary cures for warts or headaches or tooth
decay.102
Thus, for purposes of forcible commitment Feinberg conceptualizes
two clearly distinct groups of mental illnesses: (1) those which
deprive the person of his or her rational faculties and can justify
involuntary commitment when such commitment is in the rational
best interest of the patient, and (2) those—“many or most”—which
involve “emotional or volitional disorders that leave [the person’s]
cognitive faculties quite unimpaired” and thus render involuntary
commitment unjustifiably coercive in the same way that forcing a
person into treatment for warts or tooth decay would be coercive.
Feinberg’s position implies that a respondent who suffers
from a severe mood disorder (without psychotic features) should be
treated as autonomous and rational for purposes of the commitment
statutes. The state should respect that person’s preference not to be
hospitalized, since in such cases the person’s disorder is
“emotional” rather than “cognitive.” Thus, a person who is severely
depressed and thinks constantly of killing himself suffers merely
from an “emotional” problem and should be treated as fully rational
and competent for the purposes of involuntary commitment. A
court would have no legitimate cause to interfere with such a
person’s decision to reject hospitalization so that he may kill
himself.
Feinberg’s model rests upon a background dichotomy
between the cognitive and the emotional, between mind and mood.
And for the law this model has great intuitive appeal. It adopts a
generally rights-oriented, abolitionist stance while also carving out
a category of serious, cleanly defined mental disorders which
disable the core cognitive capacities that merit respect and
deference from the liberal state.
Further, the Feinberg standard would easily adjudicate some
involuntary commitment cases, those at the extremes. Thus,
suppose that Alice wants to jump off a building because her
internal voices are telling her she can fly; or that Bob works all the
time because he delusionally believes that his family are Martians

102.

Id. (emphasis added).
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in disguise and if he goes home they will kill him.103 Both cases
involve psychotic disorders that interfere with the patients’ thinking
and ability to make reality-based inferences and decisions. Under
the Feinberg model, the state could justifiably intervene, in the
rational best interest of respondents, and force both Alice and
Bruce into psychiatric treatment. On the other hand, if Alice wants
to jump in order to end the excruciating, escalating, and unavoidable pain from her terminal illness; or Bob continues his fulltilt work schedule because work is the most important thing in his
life and he would rather be able to work all the time for a few
months than live for years without the work he loves; those desires
(although many might disagree with them) are rationally
comprehensible and coherent. Thus, the courts in such cases should
respect respondents’ preferences to refuse treatment and deny the
commitment petitions.
If all mental disorders did clearly fall into distinct and
separate “cognitive” and “emotional” categories, Feinberg’s quasiabolitionist model would be a natural solution to the problem of
balancing need for treatment with respect for individual rights. But
reality is much messier than this. Contemporary psychological
science convincingly argues that no firm boundary divides the
cognitive from the emotional, nor does such a clean separation
divide normality from mental illness.104 Even schizophrenia, the
mental disorder most closely associated (at least in the public mind)
with impairment of a person’s cognitive abilities, does not neatly fit
this paradigm. For one thing, schizophrenia has an important
emotional component. The so-called “negative” symptoms of the
disorder, characterized by depression, low energy, and flat
emotional affect, can be extremely disabling, and may be more
resistant to treatment, than the “positive” or cognition-disabling
symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions.105 And when we
103.
Again, such events do occur in ways that affect legal rights. See, e.g.,
supra notes 79, 81 (describing cases of Russell Weston and Eric Clark).
104.
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Gray, Brain Systems That Mediate Both Emotion
and Cognition, 4 COGNITION AND EMOTION 269 (1990). See generally Mick
Power & Tim Dalgleish, COGNITION AND EMOTION: FROM ORDER TO DISORDER
(2d ed. 2008).
105.
See, e.g., S.M. Stahl & Peter F. Buckey, Negative Symptoms of
Schizophrenia: A Problem That Will Not Go Away, 115 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA
SCANDINAVICA 4 (2007); Stephen M. Erhart et al., Treatment of Schizophrenia
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begin to consider the most serious emotional disorders such as
major depression,106 Feinberg’s dichotomy completely breaks
down. Like schizophrenia, major depression is defined both by
cognitive and emotional symptoms—by thoughts and by moods.
The DSM-IV-TR defined “major depressive episode”, the basis for
a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder, to include a variety of
physical and cognitive symptoms—the former including emotions
such as sadness, insomnia, significant weight changes; the latter
including “feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate
guilt . . . nearly every day,” “diminished ability to think or
concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day,” and “recurrent
thoughts of death . . . recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific
plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing
suicide.”107 At another end of the mood spectrum, DSM also
Negative Symptoms: Future Prospects, 32 SCHIZOPHR BULL 234 (2006); P.F.
Liddle, The Symptoms of Chronic Schizophrenia: A Re-examination of the
Positive-negative Dichotomy, 151 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 145 (1987). See also
DSM-5, supra note 83, at 87–88 (Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic
Disorders characterized by “key features” including “negative symptoms” such
as “diminished emotional expression”).
106.
DSM-IV-TR categorized the Depressive and Bipolar Disorders as
“mood disorders.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 382, 369. DSM-5 categorizes
the two types of disorder separately: “Depressive Disorders” and “Bipolar and
Related Disorders.” DSM-V, supra note 83, at 155, 123.
107.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 160–61. For purposes here, DSM-5
closely parallels DSM-IV-TR in this respect. DSM-5 defines “major depressive
disorder” in distinctly (though not exclusively) emotional terms:
Diagnostic Criteria [:]
A. Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been
present during the same 2-week period and represent a
change from previous functioning; at least one of the
symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of
interest or pleasure.
1. Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every
day, as indicated by either subjective report (e.g.,
feels sad, empty, hopeless) or observation made by
others (e.g., appears tearful). (Note: In children and
adolescents, can be irritable mood.)
2. Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or
almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every
day (as indicated by either subjective account or
observation).
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defines Generalized Anxiety Disorder as a mixture of emotional
and cognitive symptoms (e.g., “Excessive anxiety and worry
(apprehensive expectation), occurring more days than not for at
least six months, about a number of events or activities (such as
work or school performance.”).108
3. Significant weight loss when not dieting or
weight gain (e.g., a change of more than 5% of body
weight in a month), or decrease or increase in
appetite nearly every day. (Note: In children,
consider failure to make expected weight gain.)
4. Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day.
5. Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every
day (observable by others, not merely subjective
feelings of restlessness or being slowed down).
6. Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day.
7. Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or
inappropriate guilt (which may be delusional) nearly
every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about
being sick).
8. Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or
indecisiveness, nearly every day (either by subjective account or as observed by others).
9. Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of
dying), recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific
plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for
committing suicide.
Id. at 160–61.
108.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83. Similarly, among the Anxiety Disorders
in DSM-5, Generalized Anxiety Disorder is defined as follows:
Diagnostic Criteria 300.02 (F41.1) [:]
A.
Excessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive
expectation), occurring more days than not for at
least 6 months, about a number of events or activities
(such as work or school performance).
B.
The individual finds it difficult to control the worry.
C.
The anxiety and worry are associated with three (or
more) of the following six symptoms (with at least
some symptoms having been present for more days
than not for the past 6 months):
Note: Only one item is required in children.
1. Restlessness or feeling keyed up or on
edge.
2. Being easily fatigued.
3. Difficulty concentrating or mind going
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The DSM definitions of these two paradigmatic
“emotional” disorders reflect a foundational belief in modern
psychology and psychiatry: That mental disorders are not cleanly
separable into “emotional” and “cognitive” categories, and (by
implication) that rules grounded in such a separation do not reflect
current thinking or the best science in the mental health
professions.109
blank.
4. Irritability.
5. Muscle tension.
6. Sleep disturbance (difficulty falling or
staying asleep, or restless, unsatisfying
sleep).
D.
The anxiety, worry, or physical symptoms cause
clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
E.
The disturbance is not attributable to the
physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of
abuse, a medication) or another medical condition
(e.g., hyperthyroidism).
F.
The disturbance is not better explained by another
mental disorder (e.g., anxiety or worry about having
panic attacks in panic disorder, negative evaluation in
social anxiety disorder [social phobia], contamination
or other obsessions in obsessive-compulsive disorder,
separation from attachment figures in separation
anxiety disorder, reminders of traumatic events in
posttraumatic stress disorder, gaining weight in
anorexia nervosa, physical complaints in somatic
symptom disorder, perceived appearance flaws in
body dysmorphic disorder, having a serious illness in
illness anxiety disorder, or the content of delusional
beliefs in schizophrenia or delusional disorder).
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 222.
109.
See, e.g., Alice M. Isen, Some Perspectives on Positive Feelings and
Emotions: Positive Affect Facilitates Thinking and Problem-Solving, in
F EELINGS AND E MOTIONS : T HE A MSTERDAM S YMPOSIUM 263 (Antony
Manstead, Nico Frijda, & Agneta Fischer eds., 2004):
The work reviewed in this chapter indicates that positive affect
facilitates careful, thorough thinking and problem solving, and
promotes a flexible, responsive approach to situations that
fosters new learning as well as utilization of existing
knowledge. Evidence indicates that these processes also
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For the law of involuntary commitment, this matters. It
matters because once we acknowledge the impossibility of
separating “cognitive” from “emotional” disorders—that mental
disorder almost always involves both cognitive and mood-related
components and the two are intricately bound up with each other—
then we are forced to admit that a very wide range of disorders
could form the psychological predicate for a finding of “mental
illness” in the involuntary commitment context. Someone suffering
from a serious mood disorder—say, Major Depression—may be
prey to mental confusion, a slowing of cognitive processes
generally, and/or constant thoughts of suicide, thoughts which are
as integral a part of her disorder as the sad mood which
accompanies them.110 Such thoughts can interfere with normal
cognitive functioning in serious and dramatic ways, and it is hard to
see how the law would be any more justified in ignoring such
cognitive deficits than it would be in ignoring the disabled mental
processing of the schizophrenic whose cognitive abilities are
distorted by delusions. Of course, confusion, sadness, and other
symptoms of depression can be more or less severe depending on
the case. But that is also true with schizophrenia, whose sufferers
may display a wide variety of positive and negative symptoms and
who possess varying levels of ability to cope with such
symptoms.111 If schizophrenia “qualifies” under the mental illness
facilitate pro-social behavior and flexibility in social
perception . . . .Thus, the chapter argues for a conceptualization that integrates affect, cognition, and behavior/
motivation (the traditional trichotomy of mind) and recognizes
the fact that they mutually influence one another. The chapter
argues against the common assumption that affect and
cognition are separate, competing systems or approaches, and
shows, instead, that they have mutual influence and are subject
to similar processes.
Id.
110.
See supra, note 107 (DSM description of Major Depressive
Disorder).
111.
DSM-5, in fact, speaks of a “schizophrenia spectrum,” reflecting a
current belief in psychiatry that many mental disorders are best conceptualized
along a continuum as opposed to the “there or not there” categorization featured
in the previous editions of DSM. DSM-5, supra note 83, at 87–88 (defining
Schizophrenia Spectrum). Further, recent research suggests that some
schizophrenic patients can benefit from Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, which
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criterion of the forcible commitment standard, then so should any
illness which can potentially disable the patient’s normal cognitive
functioning. Thus, the person suffering from Major Depression,
who is tormented by convictions of worthlessness as well as
constant thoughts of killing himself, and eventually tries to act on
those thoughts, is potentially of as much concern as the person who
decides to jump off a building because she is delusional and
convinced that, even if the fall kills her, she will immediately come
back to life.
This realization helps greatly to focus the argument because
it confirms the importance of the rational capacity theory suggested
above. What should concern the law of involuntary commitment is
not the presence or absence of a “mental illness,” but (1) the
presence or absence of the threshold capacities to deliberate about
options and choose a rational course of action; and (2) the clear
presence of a causal link between the lack of such threshold
capacities, on the one hand, and the state’s justification for overriding the person’s refusal of treatment on the other. Persons whose
behavior presents a risk of serious self-harm and who lack the
capacity to make rational choices about whether or not to accept
treatment may be committed against their will for the purpose of
restoring such capacities and returning the decision about further
treatment back to them. Testimony from mental health
professionals—for example, as to the respondent’s actual level of
cognitive functioning and ability to deliberate and reason, or the
availability of treatments which could alleviate or cure any
cognitive deficits—may be helpful to the law in such cases. But no
formal finding of “mental illness” should be required since “mental
illness,” by itself, is not what the law should care about; the
capacity to reason and deliberate is.

can help them learn to control their hallucinations and delusions and the
behavior results therefrom. See, e.g., Douglas Turkington, David Kingdon &
Peter J. Weiden, Cognitive Behavior Therapy for Schizophrenia, 163 A M . J.
P SYCHIATRY 365 (2006) (reporting that “[a] growing body of evidence supports
the use of cognitive behavior therapy for the treatment of schizophrenia” and
concluding: “The strength of the evidence supporting cognitive behavior therapy
for schizophrenia suggests that this technique should have more attention and
support in the United States.”). See generally DAVID KINGDON & DOUGLAS
TURKINGTON, C OGNITIVE-B EHAVIORAL T HERAPY OF S CHIZOPHRENIA (1994).
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One significant potential benefit of changing the rules in
this way is that it promises to end the subliminal tug-of-war
between the legal (rights-focused) and psychiatric/psychological
(treatment-focused) halves of the commitment standard as it exists
today. In the 1970s, lawyers led the reform effort which created
the two-pronged “danger and mental illness” standard that still
dominates state commitment statutes across the nation. The idea
was to give courts a doctrinal basis (through the dangerousness
prong) on which to guard the rights of respondents who chose not
to receive hospitalization or psychiatric treatment. But the
standard’s “mental illness” prong seems to command the input of
the mental health profession, whose conception of mental disorder
has been formed with the primary goal of treating patients, not of
assessing their ability to decide matters relevant to their legal
status. Although in particular cases the application of the
commitment standard can be informed by testimony from mental
health professionals, the standard must ultimately speak in terms
that are wholly accessible to legal, rather than medical, judgments.
What we need, in short, is a purely legal standard which
contains (1) a dangerousness element; (2) a cognitive capacity
element designed to gauge the respondent’s ability to exercise
autonomous judgment on the question of hospitalization or other
psychiatric treatment; and (3) a causal element explicitly linking
the legitimacy of state intervention to the respondent’s deliberative
and reasoning capacities.
This might seem to be an alien idea—the search for a purely
legal standard whose fundamental purpose is to assess a
defendant’s cognitive abilities. But to find an instructive analogy
we need only look across the border from the civil to the criminal
law, to the criminal law’s defense of insanity. In Part C, I pursue
such an analogy.
C. Comparing Insanity
The criminal law applies a strong presumption that
defendants are responsible—that they possess the threshold
capacities necessary in order to obey the law and to deserve blame
(and therefore punishment) if they do not.112 The law admits a
112.
See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, The Presumption of Sanity: Bursting the
Bubble, 25 UCLA L. R EV . 637, 637 (1977–78) (“It was Lord Chief Justice
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small number of affirmative defenses—defenses that might excuse
or justify what would otherwise be a crime—on grounds either (1)
that the defendant did the right thing under the circumstances (e.g.,
self-defense and necessity) or (2) that the defendant did the wrong
thing but could not help it because, for example, at the time of the
otherwise criminal act the defendant suffered from a mental disease
or defect which rendered her unable to understand what she was
doing, to know it was wrong, or to control her impulse to do it
(e.g., insanity).113 Thus, in insanity cases the law admits the
possibility that a person might not be responsible if her mental
defect was such that it caused her to lack threshold cognitive or
moral capacities at the time of the act.114
“Insanity” is now considered a purely legal term; both
lawyers and psychologists are taught this, and it is repeated so often
on both sides as to be a cliché.115 But for most of its long life,

Tindal, responding to the questions posed by the House of Lords in Daniel
M’Naghten’s Case, who first popularized the principle that ‘every man is
presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be
responsible for his crimes.’ This so-called presumption of sanity is operative and
unquestioned in every American jurisdiction today.”).
113.
See, e.g., the so-called M’Naghten test for insanity (which follows
the standard laid down by Justice Tindal in M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng.
Rep. 718 (H.L.) (“[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong.”); and the American Law Institute
(ALI) insanity test, according to which “A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Most American
jurisdictions have adopted one or another of these tests in some version. See,
e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749–52 (Souter, J., for the majority)
(discussing the various incarnations of the insanity defense among the states).
114.
See, e.g., the M’Naghten test for insanity (which follows the standard
laid down by Justice Tindal in M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(H.L.); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
115.
See, e.g., Ryan Howes, The Definition of Insanity is…, P SYCHOLOGY
T ODAY (July 27, 2009), http://www.psychologytod-ay.com/blog/in-therapy/200
907/the-definition-insanity-is (“To be clear, insanity is a legal term pertaining to

2014

Mental Illness and Danger to Self

307

insanity was a medical term—one that defined the realm of mental
illness and was proudly worn by those who sought to treat it. Some
facts about insanity’s journey from medicine to law will inform the
attempt to articulate the proper civil standard for involuntary
commitment.
1. The Battle Over Insanity, or Why Psychiatry “Gifted”
Insanity to the Law
In a fascinating article, What’s in a Name? A Brief Foray
into the History of Insanity in England and the United States,
historian Janet Tighe details the early twentieth-century battle
between law and psychiatry over the concept of insanity.116 Tighe
attempts to put this struggle in historical perspective, arguing that
“[u]ntil well into the [nineteenth] century the word insanity was
ubiquitous, not only in medical writing but in that of the legal and
lay world as well. It was the general term used by both professions
and the public to refer, in the words of the 1851 Webster’s
Dictionary, to the ‘state of being unsound in mind’ and ‘applicable
to any degree of mental derangement from slight delirium or
wandering, to distraction.’”117 Medical texts, law texts, and court
opinions freely used the word,118 as did the organizations and
publications of those who treated the mentally ill.119 Both the

a defendant’s ability to determine right from wrong when a crime is
committed.”).
116.
Janet Tighe, What’s in a Name? A Brief Foray into the History of
Insanity in England and the United States 33 J. A M . A CAD . P SYCHIATRY &
L AW 252 (2005) [hereinafter Tighe, What’s in a Name?].
117.
Id. at 253.
118.
M’Naghten’s case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, is only one famous
example.
119.
See, e.g., Tighe, What’s in a Name?, supra note 116, at 253 (“Use of
the term [“insanity”] appears to have been relatively unproblematic for members
of the legal and medical profession. Law texts, legislation, and cases are littered
with it, as are medical texts in which the term is used interchangeably with
unsound mind, deranged, crazy, non compos mentis, lunacy, madness, and
alienation . . . . Even the first bodies of nationally organized medical
professionals in the United States and Great Britain, the asylum superintendents,
proudly used the word . . . in the name of their organizations (e.g., the
Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane)
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medical and legal professions shared a sense that, if they did not
always agree about the meaning of insanity, it was nonetheless
important to share the term and to have a common language by
which to understand and articulate the nature of mental illness in
both the asylum and the courtroom.120
That began to change in the late nineteenth century, partly
as a result of growing rifts within what would become the
professions of psychiatry and forensic psychology, and partly as a
result of substantive debates over particular concepts, particularly
the idea of “moral insanity,” which highlighted the varying needs
and approaches toward mental illness of medical professionals on
the one hand and the law on the other. The emerging field of
neurology, which sought dominance of psychiatry around this time,
viewed insanity as an unscientific concept that belonged to a
receding era of failed asylum treatments.121 In 1909, the American
Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology deputized its committee
on Insanity and Criminal Responsibility—which included prominent medical figures such as William A. White and Adolf Meyer—
to create and propose a joint vision of the insanity defense. “Over
and over again, their efforts broke down as the lawyers . . . and the
physicians tried to explain to each other what they meant by
insanity. Ultimately agreeing to disagree, the committee drafted
model legislation, which all the physicians felt was woefully
inadequate.”122 The failure to agree on common language to describe mental illness foreshadowed the ejection of the term
“insanity” from the psychiatric realm —the outright “gifting” of
insanity to the law:

and in their journal titles, such as the American Journal of Insanity (which is the
parent of the American Journal of Psychiatry”) (citations omitted).
120.
Id. at 254 (“Initially taking for granted the shared language of
insanity, [American Physician Isaac] Ray and many others interested in the
topic, including legal scholars, such as Frances Wharton, saw this sharing as a
good thing. The first versions of Ray’s text and Wharton’s . . . underlined the
need to have the law, medicine, and the public all speaking the same language.
That they could find situations in which this was not the case, particularly in the
courtroom, dismayed both of them and inspired their efforts to educate and
reform the insanity defense.”) (citation omitted).
121.
Id. at 254−55.
122.
Id. at 255.
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By the 1930s, their dream of a shared medical-legal
language and a common object of analysis was
nothing more than ceremonial rhetoric. Embedded
in their very word choice was the belief that law and
psychiatry were focusing on very different things.
The law was developing mechanisms by which
knowledge about mental illness could be introduced
into a legal proceeding and used with other relevant
information to make decisions about such legal
categories as responsibility and competence. Psychiatry, on the other hand, was developing mechanisms for diagnosing and treating illness and
disease. To confuse the two would only spell
disaster or at least more years of . . . the pointless
wrangling in the courtroom that psychiatrists like
White and Meyer so abhorred.123
Unlike insanity, involuntary commitment is not a criminal
concept or process, and that substantive distinction should not be
forgotten. But speaking structurally rather than substantively, the
history of insanity is enormously instructive here, for at least two
reasons. First, it illuminates a problem that lies at the core of the
law-and-psychiatry dialogue not only in the insanity context but
also in the civil commitment one: the difficulty of marrying
concepts of mental disorder and disease that are formed for the
purpose of diagnosis and treatment, with the conceptions of
individual rights and responsibility that animate our law. This is a
problem that eventually proved unsolvable in the insanity context,
with the result that insanity came to be viewed as a legal and not a
psychiatric concept. The criminal law, of course, calls on mental
health professionals for their assessments and expert testimony in
cases where the insanity defense is at issue. But both professions
now understand that although psychiatric assessment and input can
be helpful, the ultimate judgment as to a defendant’s insanity is a
legal decision that can, and should, be made in terms intelligible
and responsive to the law’s central concerns about blameworthiness
and responsibility, not to psychiatry’s concern about treatment or
cure.
123.

Id. at 256.
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Second, the terms and the structure of the criminal insanity
defense ought to inform the legal-psychiatric conversation about
involuntary civil commitment. Both the M’Naghten and the
American Law Institute (ALI) versions of the insanity defense124
contain three fundamental requirements: (1) the presence of a
mental disease or defect; (2) a causal link between such disease or
defect and the defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime; and
(3) a description of the mental capacities at issue in assessing the
defendant’s responsibility for the act (s)he committed. Thus, the
M’Naghten Rule prescribes:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the party accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he
did not know what he was doing was wrong.125
And, the ALI version states:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.126
Important differences exist between the two formulations. Again, I
focus here on three structural requirements they share: (1) presence
of a mental disease/defect; (2) which has caused psychological
disabilities127 that (3) deprived the accused of relevant threshold
124.
See M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
125.
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
In a sense the insanity standard contains two causal elements: (1) a
requirement that the defendant’s incapacities were caused by “mental disease or
defect,” and (2) a requirement that it is those incapacities which deprived the
defendant of the relevant knowledge/appreciation of what he or she was doing
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knowledge (or, under the ALI test, “appreciation”)—such as the
knowledge that the defendant was squeezing someone’s neck, not a
lemon, or the knowledge that (s)he was doing something that is
considered morally wrong; or of threshold capacities such as the
capacity to control his/her impulse to break the law.
Consider the first requirement, that defendant suffer from a
“mental disease or defect.” On its face this seems to raise the same
problem that we saw with the involuntary commitment standard—it
seems to call for a medical judgment rather than a legal one. But
appearances are deceiving in this instance. At least in part, the
“mental disease or defect” requirement is a hangover from bygone
days when insanity was widely used in both the medical and legal
worlds.128 But a second fact is even more important. To the extent
it inescapably refers to the medical understanding of psychological
disorder, the insanity test’s mental disease/defect element continues
to cause the same problems which led to psychiatry’s “gifting” of
insanity to law a century ago—the problems of disagreement and
confusion over whose conception of “mental disease” should
govern, and over the precise meaning of “mental disease or defect”
in the context of each particular case.129 In fact, the mental disease
element is best understood structurally rather than substantively—
that is, it functions simply to rule out insanity claims by certain
defendants, such as those whose mental disabilities at the time of
the criminal act were self-inflicted by intoxication or other means.
when he or she did the act. It is not clear that these two conceptions of cause are
identical. At the very least, the second formulation seems crucial to construction
of a purely legal commitment standard. Id.
128.
For example, M’Naghten’s Case was published in 1843.
M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.).
129.
See State v. Guido, 191 A.2d 45 (N.J. 1963) (court-appointed
psychiatrists examined defendant and found her to be legally sane. After
meeting with defendant’s attorney the psychiatrists changed their opinion,
finding defendant insane. On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that
the change was thoroughly consistent with honesty however mistaken it might
be. . . . Specifically, the doctors originally understood that the “disease of the
mind” required by [M’Naghten] means a psychosis and not some lesser illness
or functional aberration. As the result of their pretrial debate with [the defense
attorney], the doctors concluded that they had too narrow a view of M’Naghten
and that the “anxiety neurosis” they had found did qualify as a “disease” within
the legal rule, and hence . . . defendant did not know right from wrong and she
did not know what she was doing was wrong because of that “disease.” Id.
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On that interpretation, the requirement of mental disease or defect
may be the law’s way of restricting the defense to those persons
who suffer relevant psychological incapacities through no fault of
their own. Read in this way, the element remains entirely
explicable in law language, focusing on blameworthiness and
responsibility.
It is the remaining two elements of the insanity tests that are
most illuminating for the civil commitment standard. Those two
elements (2) articulate the incapacities that may excuse a defendant
from responsibility, and (3) require that those incapacities be the
cause of defendant’s lack of threshold knowledge or self-control at
the time of the act. In the next section I argue that these two prongs
offer a compelling model for involuntary civil commitment.
2. Toward a Purely Legal Standard for Involuntary
Commitment
Consider, again, the basic structural elements of such a
standard – elements that, if satisfied, justify the state in overruling a
respondent’s preference not to be hospitalized or receive
psychiatric treatment. Those elements are: (1) danger/risk of harm
to self; (2) the presence of cognitive and deliberative incapacity
that (3) deprives the respondent of the capacity to make a rational
decision about treatment. Contra Feinberg, any mental illness,
mental disorder, or mental condition could be the basis for these
disabilities—but mental illness or disorder per se is not required.
The elements can be translated into a civil standard that,
like the criminal insanity defense, refers the involuntary commitment decision entirely to the law and thus ends the tug of war
between rights and treatment that has characterized the standard for
decades.
A standard crafted along these lines would require two
primary findings: that the respondent poses a serious, likely, and
imminent risk of harm to self, and that he or she lacks the
capacities to understand his/her difficulties; deliberate about the
benefits and costs of treatment; and make a rational decision in
his/her own best interests. Such incapacity would justify state
intervention to force treatment over the respondent’s objection.
Thus, a model statute might provide:
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A person shall be eligible for involuntary
hospitalization if the court finds based upon clear
and convincing evidence, that:
(1) the respondent is unable to make a rational and
informed decision as to whether or not treatment
would be desirable, and
(2) the respondent poses a serious and imminent
risk of harm to self . . . .130
The clear and convincing standard of proof would require a
persuasive demonstration (not merely more likely than not, as a
preponderance standard would allow) of the respondent’s lack of
capacity, thus offering some protection against the possibility that
the mere refusal to be treated would be taken as proof of the
respondent’s lack of ability to make a rational decision. And, the
“danger to self” criterion would filter out cases in which the
defendant’s incapacity does not pose a serious threat to his or her
well-being or that of others. Psychiatric/psychological testimony
could of course be relevant to proving either or both elements, but
no explicit finding of “mental illness” or “mental disorder” would
be necessary. The ultimate judgment about whether to confine
someone against their will would reside where it belongs: with the
law, attuned to the language of rights and accustomed to assessing
the harm and the cognitive capacities of persons who come before
it.

130.
Compare this hypothetical model statute with ALA. CODE § 22-5210.4 (1975), which contains the “rational and informed decision” language
above, but also mandates a finding of mental illness:
(a). A respondent may be committed to inpatient treatment
if the probate court finds, based on clear and convincing
evidence that (i) the respondent is mentally ill; (ii) as a result
of the mental illness the respondent poses a real and present
threat of substantial harm to self and/or others; the respondent
will, if not treated, continue to suffer mental distress and will
continue to experience deterioration of the ability to function
independently; and (iv) the respondent is unable to make a
rational and informed decision as to whether or not treatment
for mental illness would be desirable.
Id.

314

Mental Health Law & Policy Journal

Vol. 3

The proposed standard honors core intuitions that inform
our law. One is that the state should not forcibly incarcerate
someone only because he or she is mentally ill; there should be a
strong presumption that mentally disordered persons, as persons,
are generally able to make their own decisions and act in their own
best interests. Under the proposed standard, before being
committed against her will a person must lack certain cognitive and
deliberative capacities to make a rational and informed decision
about treatment.131
A second intuition is that the law should not lock people up
only for doing things that pose a “danger to self”—things that risk
self-harm or even risk life. Only if the respondent poses such a risk
and lacks the capacity to make his/her own decisions about
treatment would the law be justified in stepping in. Thus, the
standard could not force Dan the heavy drinker into treatment. It
could not force adventurers like Steve Fossett into treatment. It
could not force Justice Jackson, who continued working against
medical advice, into treatment. And, it could not force Bruce or
Alice into treatment as long as they possessed capacity to make
rational decisions about whether or not to receive psychiatric
care.132
Third, the proposed standard steps away from the
requirement of “mental illness” and focuses the inquiry squarely on
the capacities, which ought to determine the limits of state
intervention.
Finally, the proposed standard clarifies the cases of Alice
and Bruce in ways that match our intuitions about the role of law
both as the guardian of individual rights and as parens patriae—
again, without reference to the presence or absence of “mental
131.
Compare the insanity defense, which operates in a similar way.
Everyone acknowledged, for example, that Eric Clark, the defendant in Clark v.
Arizona (discussing defendant Eric Clark’s “undisputed paranoid schizophrenia”
at the time he shot and killed a police officer), was mentally ill and actively
psychotic at time of the crime. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 743 (2006). Yet,
the trial court determined Clark was not insane, but was mentally ill and was
aware of what he was doing and that it was wrong. Id.
132.
What counts as a “rational decision” is, of course, fundamental in
this context. What the law tries to gauge is a respondent’s threshold capacity to
make decisions, not whether his or her particular decision about treatment is
approved by, or dovetails nicely with, the intuition of the court.
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illness.” Thus, if Alice (a) refuses treatment because she fears an
imminent Martian invasion and wants to die before it occurs, the
state may intervene on the grounds that her delusional thinking
demonstrates a lack of capacity for making a rational choice about
treatment. But if (b) Alice chooses to take her own life because she
can no longer bear the pain of her terminal disease and there is, in
fact, no chance she will get better or that her pain level will drop
significantly, then the state should not intervene—even if most
people, including the court, believe they would choose differently
in her place. If Bruce (a) decides to shorten his life by working
because he delusionally believes he cannot go home since his
family is plotting to kill him, the commitment petition could be
granted. But if Bruce, like Justice Jackson, simply (b) values his
work above everything else in life and chooses to take the risk that
his work schedule will hasten his death, the state would not
intervene—even if most people, including Bruce’s family and the
court, believe that his values are wrong and that he should choose
differently.133 Decisions (a) demonstrate the lack of capacities to
133.
A potential problem arises when courts focus on assessing the
content of a respondent’s reasons in order to gauge their capacity to make
choices about treatment. In the examples above, content seems obviously
relevant in assessing capacity. But, the standard should prevent courts from
conflating reasons with capacity in the sense that disagreement with a
respondent’s reasons proves respondent’s lack of capacity. Reasons are relevant
to, but not dispositive of, capacity and the commitment standard must clearly
establish that distinction. But in many cases it would seem quite possible to do
this. See Dershowitz, supra note 17, at 375. Dershowitz discusses the case of
sixty-two-year-old Mrs. Lake, who “suffers from arteriosclerosis which causes
periods of confusion interspersed with periods of relative rationality.” Id. One
day she was found wandering around downtown Washington looking confused
but bothering no one, whereupon she was committed to a mental hospital. She
petitioned for release and at her trial testified, during a period of apparent
rationality, that she was aware of her problem, that she knew that her periods of
confusion endangered her health and even her life, but that she had experienced
the mental hospital and preferred to assume the risk of living–and perhaps
dying–outside its walls. Id. Mrs. Lake’s petition for release was denied. Id.
Under the standard articulated in this context, the petition for release would have
been granted on the grounds that although her illness produced confusion and
clearly interfered with her cognitive capacities generally–and although the
courts and most people might disagree with her decision to refuse
hospitalization–the reasons she gave for refusing treatment demonstrate a
capacity to think clearly about her illness and its potential consequences and to
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deliberate and choose in a rational way; decisions (b) demonstrate
the presence of such capacities although the actual choice produced
may be unusual or unpopular. The proposed standard achieves the
appropriate goals and according to the right (legal) values—
protecting rights; guarding individual autonomy; and showing
strong respect for a respondent’s capacity to act in his or her own
best interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the decades since legal advocates for the mentally ill
successfully fought for a rights-based dangerousness element in the
standard for involuntary commitment, that success has come under
continuous attack from the treatment-focused side of the
conversation. From the perspective of the mental health profession,
whose primary concern is that mentally disordered people get the
treatment they need, a rights-based standard for involuntary
commitment threatens to leave vulnerable patients unprotected.134
And, as deinstitutionalization emptied state psychiatric hospitals in
the mid-to-late twentieth century, that fear seemed to become
reality. Deinstitutionalization generated a fierce debate not only
about the relationship between mental illness and homelessness but
more generally, about the availability of treatment for persons with
serious mental illness.135 This, in turn, has led to a significant shift
in focus, in both the scholarly and popular media, away from the
need to win legal rights for the mentally ill and toward getting them
treated.136 State statutes have shifted focus accordingly; most now
allow a person to be committed for inpatient treatment against
weigh the costs and benefits of inpatient treatment against those of living outside
the hospital.
134.
Thus, the phrase “dying with their rights on.” Treffert, supra note 15.
135.
See H. Richard Lamb, Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless
Mentally Ill, 35 H OSP . & C OMMUNITY P SYCHIATRY 899 (1984).
136.
See, e.g., Minds on the Edge, supra note 15; “Frontline: The New
Asylums,” www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/asylums (2005) (jails and
prisons have become “the new asylums” for mentally-ill persons who commit
crimes); FRONTLINE: THE RELEASED, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/fro-ntline/shows
/released (2009) (tracing the experiences of mentally ill inmates released into the
community). See generally, Eliminating the Barriers, supra note 4 (advocating
legal rules that would make it easier to commit mentally ill persons
involuntarily).
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his/her will on grounds of “grave need for treatment” or something
similar—the standard that predated the reforms of the 1970s.137
Further, more than half the states now allow involuntary outpatient
treatment, permitting courts to order compliance with an out-ofhospital psychiatric treatment regime that the patient does not
want.138 The widespread adoption of involuntary outpatient
commitment potentially expands the reach of forced treatment
regimes to cover a much larger group of mentally ill persons than
would be reachable under the standard for involuntary inpatient
treatment.139
137.
See, e.g., Treatment Advocacy Center, Improved Treatment
Standards, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/soluti
on/improved-treatment-standards (majority of states allow commitment on
grounds of need for treatment such as “grave disability”).
138.
See supra, note 82.
139.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.2 (1975). The Alabama statute
states that:
A respondent may be committed to outpatient treatment if the
probate court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence
that: (1) the respondent is mentally ill; (ii) as a result of the
mental illness the respondent will, if not treated, continue to
suffer mental distress and will continue to experience
deterioration of the ability to function independently; and (iii)
the respondent is unable to make a rational and informed
decision as to whether or not treatment for mental illness
would be desirable.
Id.; GA. CODE. ANN. § 37-3-61(2) (West 2013) (“Any person may file with the
court a petition executed under oath alleging that a person within the county is a
mentally ill person requiring involuntary treatment.”); GA. CODE. ANN. § 37-31(12.1) (West 2013). The Georgia statute states that:
‘Outpatient’ means a person who is mentally ill and: (A) who
is not an inpatient but who, based on the person’s treatment
history or current mental status, will require outpatient
treatment in order to avoid predictable and imminently
becoming an inpatient; (B) Who because of the person’s
current mental status, mental history, or nature of the person’s
mental illness is unable voluntarily to seek or comply with
outpatient treatment; and (C) who is in need of involuntary
treatment.
Id.; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(C) (McKinney 2013). The New York
statute states that:
A person may be ordered to receive assisted outpatient
treatment if the court finds that such person: (1) is eighteen
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This Article, therefore, bucks the winds of current opinion
by arguing for a renewed focus on rights rather than treatment. But
that change in focus is necessary. It is time to end the tug of war
between psychiatry and law that underlies the “mental illness and
danger to self” standard. Forcible commitment is a legal decision
that must be fully articulated in legally relevant language and
justified by a legally comprehensible rationale.
For the law, such a rationale must be grounded in respect
for individual autonomy, including the autonomy of those who may
suffer from mental disorder. The argument for a purely legal
commitment standard must rid itself of the more extravagant antipsychiatry claims which characterized this debate in the 1960s and
1970s—for example, the claim that psychiatry is shilling for the
capitalist establishment by forcing people into hospitals in order to
maintain a docile and compliant proletariat;140 that involuntary
commitment is a method society uses to enforce bourgeois values
and silence the creative, the diverse, and the different by labeling
them as “deviant”;141 or that mental illness itself is a myth created
years of age or older; and (2) is suffering from a mental
illness; and (3) is unlikely to survive safely in the community
without supervision, based on a clinical determination; and (4)
has a history of lack of compliance with treatment for mental
illness. . . . and (5) is, as a result of his or her mental illness,
unlikely to voluntarily participate in the outpatient treatment
that would enable him or her to live safely in the community;
and (6) in view of his or her treatment history and current
behavior, is in need of assisted outpatient treatment in order to
prevent a relapse or deterioration which would be likely to
result in serious harm to the person or others as defined in
section 9.01 of this article; and (7) is likely to benefit from
assisted outpatient treatment.
Id.
140.
See id. at 150 (“The asylum reduces differences, represses vice,
eliminates irregularities. It denounces everything that opposes the essential
virtues of society . . . .”). See, e.g., Foucault, supra note 28; Andrew T. Scull,
Madness and Segregative Control: the Rise of the Insane Asylum, 24 S OC .
P ROBS. 337 (1976) (rise of the insane asylum as social control mechanism to
enforce capitalist social order); GOFFMAN, supra note 28 (psychiatric labels
subject the “deviant” to depersonalizing and stigmatizing practices).
141.
See, e.g., Rael Jean Isaac & Virginia C. Armat, The Origins of AntiPsychiatry, in M ADNESS IN THE S TREETS: H OW P SYCHIATRY AND L AW
A BANDONED THE M ENTALLY I LL (1990).
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by psychiatry to increase its own power and influence in society at
the expense of the most vulnerable.142
Shed of over-heated political rhetoric, fundamental
principles reveal themselves. There is such a thing as mental
disorder. Mental disorder can be disabling and can involve such
severe distortions of thought and reality perception that a person
might not be able to know his or her own best interest. There is no
clean line dividing cognitive from emotional disorder; mental
disorder may involve cognitive impairment accompanied by
emotional deprivations, as in schizophrenia, or disturbances of
thought and cognition that originate in mood or emotional
disruption, as in major depression. In a small number of cases a
person’s psychological disorder can be so severe, and can be
accompanied by such substantial risk of self-harm, as to deprive the
person of the capacity to make rational choices about treatment. In
such cases, the state may hospitalize a person against his will. But
forced hospitalization cannot be justified by a mere diagnosis of
mental illness; of behavior that poses risk of harm to self; or of
both together. Only where a person poses a serious risk of selfharm and is unable to make a rational and informed decision about
whether or not to receive treatment, may the law force him or her
into psychiatric care.

142.
See, e.g., supra note 28. For an argument that the theoretical
innovations brought to DSM-III were in part a reaction to these anti-psychiatry
critics, see Wilson, supra note 58, at 402–03.

